allow non-admin users to send PTZ commands for cameras they have access to (#23578)

* offload preview ffmpeg encoding to a thread to avoid blocking the api event loop

* offload Frigate+ recording snapshot upload to a thread to avoid blocking the api event loop

docker/main/rootfs/usr/local/go2rtc/create_config.py

@@ -17,7 +17,10 @@ from frigate.const import (
 )
 from frigate.ffmpeg_presets import parse_preset_hardware_acceleration_encode
 from frigate.util.config import find_config_file
-from frigate.util.services import is_restricted_go2rtc_source
+from frigate.util.services import (
+    is_go2rtc_arbitrary_exec_allowed,
+    is_restricted_go2rtc_source,
+)
 
 sys.path.remove("/opt/frigate")
 
@@ -159,6 +162,20 @@ for name in list(go2rtc_config.get("streams", {})):
             )
             del go2rtc_config["streams"][name]
 
+    elif isinstance(stream, dict):
+        # The map form ({"url": ...}) lets go2rtc resolve the source
+        # recursively, so it is effectively a dynamic way to generate the URL
+        # for a stream. That can only be backed by an exec source, so it cannot
+        # be allowed unless arbitrary exec is explicitly enabled. When it is
+        # enabled, leave the map untouched for go2rtc to resolve.
+        if not is_go2rtc_arbitrary_exec_allowed():
+            print(
+                f"[ERROR] Stream '{name}' uses a dynamic source format which is disabled by default for security. "
+                f"Set GO2RTC_ALLOW_ARBITRARY_EXEC=true to enable arbitrary exec sources."
+            )
+            del go2rtc_config["streams"][name]
+            continue
+
 # add birdseye restream stream if enabled
 if config.get("birdseye", {}).get("restream", False):
     birdseye: dict[str, Any] = config.get("birdseye")

frigate/api/export.py

@@ -91,6 +91,16 @@ def export_recording(
     playback_factor = body.playback
     playback_source = body.source
     friendly_name = body.name
+
+    # sanitize_filepath normalizes "\" to "/" but leaves ".." intact, so a path
+    # like "clips\..\..\etc/passwd" passes the CLIPS_DIR prefix check yet still
+    # escapes the directory once resolved. A valid snapshot path never uses "..".
+    if body.image_path and ".." in body.image_path:
+        return JSONResponse(
+            content=({"success": False, "message": "Invalid image path"}),
+            status_code=400,
+        )
+
     existing_image = sanitize_filepath(body.image_path) if body.image_path else None
 
     # a chapters value in the request body overrides the camera's export config

frigate/api/media.py

@@ -59,6 +59,19 @@ logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 router = APIRouter(tags=[Tags.media])
 
 
+def _resolve_cache_age(max_cache_age: int) -> int:
+    """Return max_cache_age as an int.
+
+    When a media handler is invoked directly by another handler instead of
+    through its route, FastAPI doesn't resolve the Query() default and
+    max_cache_age arrives as the Query object; fall back to its int default.
+    """
+    if isinstance(max_cache_age, int):
+        return max_cache_age
+
+    return max_cache_age.default
+
+
 @router.get("/{camera_name}", dependencies=[Depends(require_camera_access)])
 async def mjpeg_feed(
     request: Request,
@@ -380,7 +393,9 @@ async def submit_recording_snapshot_to_plus(
             )
 
         nd = cv2.imdecode(np.frombuffer(image_data, dtype=np.int8), cv2.IMREAD_COLOR)
-        request.app.frigate_config.plus_api.upload_image(nd, camera_name)
+        await asyncio.to_thread(
+            request.app.frigate_config.plus_api.upload_image, nd, camera_name
+        )
 
         return JSONResponse(
             content={
@@ -1213,7 +1228,7 @@ async def event_thumbnail(
         thumbnail_bytes,
         media_type=extension.get_mime_type(),
         headers={
-            "Cache-Control": f"private, max-age={max_cache_age}"
+            "Cache-Control": f"private, max-age={_resolve_cache_age(max_cache_age)}"
             if event_complete
             else "no-store",
         },
@@ -1517,14 +1532,14 @@ async def event_preview(request: Request, event_id: str):
     end_ts = start_ts + (
         min(event.end_time - event.start_time, 20) if event.end_time else 20
     )
-    return preview_gif(request, event.camera, start_ts, end_ts)
+    return await preview_gif(request, event.camera, start_ts, end_ts)
 
 
 @router.get(
     "/{camera_name}/start/{start_ts}/end/{end_ts}/preview.gif",
     dependencies=[Depends(require_camera_access)],
 )
-def preview_gif(
+async def preview_gif(
     request: Request,
     camera_name: str,
     start_ts: float,
@@ -1587,7 +1602,8 @@ def preview_gif(
             "-",
         ]
 
-        process = sp.run(
+        process = await asyncio.to_thread(
+            sp.run,
             ffmpeg_cmd,
             capture_output=True,
         )
@@ -1654,7 +1670,8 @@ def preview_gif(
             "-",
         ]
 
-        process = sp.run(
+        process = await asyncio.to_thread(
+            sp.run,
             ffmpeg_cmd,
             input=str.encode("\n".join(selected_previews)),
             capture_output=True,
@@ -1673,7 +1690,7 @@ def preview_gif(
         gif_bytes,
         media_type="image/gif",
         headers={
-            "Cache-Control": f"private, max-age={max_cache_age}",
+            "Cache-Control": f"private, max-age={_resolve_cache_age(max_cache_age)}",
             "Content-Type": "image/gif",
         },
     )
@@ -1683,7 +1700,7 @@ def preview_gif(
     "/{camera_name}/start/{start_ts}/end/{end_ts}/preview.mp4",
     dependencies=[Depends(require_camera_access)],
 )
-def preview_mp4(
+async def preview_mp4(
     request: Request,
     camera_name: str,
     start_ts: float,
@@ -1763,7 +1780,8 @@ def preview_mp4(
             path,
         ]
 
-        process = sp.run(
+        process = await asyncio.to_thread(
+            sp.run,
             ffmpeg_cmd,
             capture_output=True,
         )
@@ -1827,7 +1845,8 @@ def preview_mp4(
             path,
         ]
 
-        process = sp.run(
+        process = await asyncio.to_thread(
+            sp.run,
             ffmpeg_cmd,
             input=str.encode("\n".join(selected_previews)),
             capture_output=True,
@@ -1842,7 +1861,7 @@ def preview_mp4(
 
     headers = {
         "Content-Description": "File Transfer",
-        "Cache-Control": f"private, max-age={max_cache_age}",
+        "Cache-Control": f"private, max-age={_resolve_cache_age(max_cache_age)}",
         "Content-Type": "video/mp4",
         "Content-Length": str(os.path.getsize(path)),
         # nginx: https://nginx.org/en/docs/http/ngx_http_proxy_module.html#proxy_ignore_headers
@@ -1880,9 +1899,9 @@ async def review_preview(
     )
 
     if format == "gif":
-        return preview_gif(request, review.camera, start_ts, end_ts)
+        return await preview_gif(request, review.camera, start_ts, end_ts)
     else:
-        return preview_mp4(request, review.camera, start_ts, end_ts)
+        return await preview_mp4(request, review.camera, start_ts, end_ts)
 
 
 @router.get(

frigate/comms/ws.py

@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ from frigate.const import (
     UPDATE_REVIEW_DESCRIPTION,
     UPSERT_REVIEW_SEGMENT,
 )
+from frigate.models import User
 
 logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 
@@ -69,11 +70,16 @@ _WS_VIEWER_TOPICS = frozenset(
     }
 )
 
+# Camera-scoped command topics a camera-authorized (non-admin) user may send.
+_WS_CAMERA_COMMAND_TOPICS = frozenset({"ptz"})
+
 
 def _check_ws_authorization(
     topic: str,
     role_header: str | None,
     separator: str,
+    roles_config: dict[str, list[str]] | None = None,
+    camera_names: set[str] | None = None,
 ) -> bool:
     """Check if a WebSocket message is authorized.
 
@@ -81,6 +87,10 @@ def _check_ws_authorization(
         topic: The message topic.
         role_header: The HTTP_REMOTE_ROLE header value, or None.
         separator: The role separator character from proxy config.
+        roles_config: The auth.roles mapping (role -> allowed cameras), used to
+            authorize camera-scoped commands for non-admin users.
+        camera_names: All configured camera names, used to resolve a role's
+            allowed cameras.
 
     Returns:
         True if authorized, False if blocked.
@@ -90,16 +100,33 @@ def _check_ws_authorization(
         return False
 
     # No role header: default to viewer (fail-closed)
-    if role_header is None:
-        return topic in _WS_VIEWER_TOPICS
+    roles = [r.strip() for r in role_header.split(separator)] if role_header else []
 
-    # Check if any role is admin
-    roles = [r.strip() for r in role_header.split(separator)]
+    # Admin can send anything
     if "admin" in roles:
         return True
 
-    # Non-admin: only viewer topics allowed
-    return topic in _WS_VIEWER_TOPICS
+    # Read-only topics any authenticated user can send
+    if topic in _WS_VIEWER_TOPICS:
+        return True
+
+    # Camera-scoped command like "<camera>/ptz": allow when the user's role(s)
+    # grant access to that camera.
+    parts = topic.split("/")
+    if (
+        roles_config is not None
+        and len(parts) == 2
+        and parts[1] in _WS_CAMERA_COMMAND_TOPICS
+    ):
+        allowed: set[str] = set()
+        # No role header maps to the default viewer role (e.g. proxy-only setups)
+        for role in roles or ["viewer"]:
+            allowed.update(
+                User.get_allowed_cameras(role, roles_config, camera_names or set())
+            )
+        return parts[0] in allowed
+
+    return False
 
 
 class WebSocket(WebSocket_):  # type: ignore[misc]
@@ -131,6 +158,8 @@ class WebSocketClient(Communicator):
         class _WebSocketHandler(WebSocket):
             receiver = self._dispatcher
             role_separator = self.config.proxy.separator or ","
+            roles_config = self.config.auth.roles
+            camera_names = set(self.config.cameras.keys())
 
             def received_message(self, message: WebSocket.received_message) -> None:  # type: ignore[name-defined]
                 try:
@@ -152,7 +181,11 @@ class WebSocketClient(Communicator):
                     self.environ.get("HTTP_REMOTE_ROLE") if self.environ else None
                 )
                 if self.environ is not None and not _check_ws_authorization(
-                    topic, role_header, self.role_separator
+                    topic,
+                    role_header,
+                    self.role_separator,
+                    self.roles_config,
+                    self.camera_names,
                 ):
                     logger.warning(
                         "Blocked unauthorized WebSocket message: topic=%s, role=%s",

frigate/test/test_ws_auth.py

@@ -11,6 +11,16 @@ class TestCheckWsAuthorization(unittest.TestCase):
 
     DEFAULT_SEPARATOR = ","
 
+    # admin/viewer are reserved and always map to all cameras (empty list);
+    # custom roles map to a specific set of cameras.
+    ROLES_CONFIG = {
+        "admin": [],
+        "viewer": [],
+        "yard": ["front_door", "backyard"],
+        "garage_only": ["garage"],
+    }
+    CAMERA_NAMES = {"front_door", "backyard", "garage"}
+
     # --- IPC topic blocking (unconditional, regardless of role) ---
 
     def test_ipc_topic_blocked_for_admin(self):
@@ -161,6 +171,124 @@ class TestCheckWsAuthorization(unittest.TestCase):
             _check_ws_authorization("onConnect", None, self.DEFAULT_SEPARATOR)
         )
 
+    # --- Camera-scoped PTZ access (non-admin with camera access) ---
+
+    def test_viewer_can_ptz_camera_with_access(self):
+        # viewer maps to all cameras, so PTZ is allowed
+        self.assertTrue(
+            _check_ws_authorization(
+                "front_door/ptz",
+                "viewer",
+                self.DEFAULT_SEPARATOR,
+                self.ROLES_CONFIG,
+                self.CAMERA_NAMES,
+            )
+        )
+
+    def test_custom_role_can_ptz_assigned_camera(self):
+        self.assertTrue(
+            _check_ws_authorization(
+                "front_door/ptz",
+                "yard",
+                self.DEFAULT_SEPARATOR,
+                self.ROLES_CONFIG,
+                self.CAMERA_NAMES,
+            )
+        )
+
+    def test_custom_role_blocked_from_ptz_unassigned_camera(self):
+        self.assertFalse(
+            _check_ws_authorization(
+                "garage/ptz",
+                "yard",
+                self.DEFAULT_SEPARATOR,
+                self.ROLES_CONFIG,
+                self.CAMERA_NAMES,
+            )
+        )
+
+    def test_multiple_roles_union_camera_access_for_ptz(self):
+        # "yard" covers front_door/backyard, "garage_only" covers garage
+        self.assertTrue(
+            _check_ws_authorization(
+                "garage/ptz",
+                "yard,garage_only",
+                self.DEFAULT_SEPARATOR,
+                self.ROLES_CONFIG,
+                self.CAMERA_NAMES,
+            )
+        )
+
+    def test_unknown_role_blocked_from_ptz(self):
+        self.assertFalse(
+            _check_ws_authorization(
+                "front_door/ptz",
+                "nonexistent",
+                self.DEFAULT_SEPARATOR,
+                self.ROLES_CONFIG,
+                self.CAMERA_NAMES,
+            )
+        )
+
+    def test_no_role_header_treated_as_viewer_for_ptz(self):
+        # proxy-only / auth-disabled setups default to the viewer role
+        self.assertTrue(
+            _check_ws_authorization(
+                "front_door/ptz",
+                None,
+                self.DEFAULT_SEPARATOR,
+                self.ROLES_CONFIG,
+                self.CAMERA_NAMES,
+            )
+        )
+
+    def test_camera_access_does_not_grant_set_commands(self):
+        # camera access enables PTZ only, not config-changing "set" commands
+        self.assertFalse(
+            _check_ws_authorization(
+                "front_door/detect/set",
+                "yard",
+                self.DEFAULT_SEPARATOR,
+                self.ROLES_CONFIG,
+                self.CAMERA_NAMES,
+            )
+        )
+
+    def test_ptz_autotracker_stays_admin_only(self):
+        # ptz_autotracker is a config toggle, not a live-view action
+        self.assertFalse(
+            _check_ws_authorization(
+                "front_door/ptz_autotracker/set",
+                "viewer",
+                self.DEFAULT_SEPARATOR,
+                self.ROLES_CONFIG,
+                self.CAMERA_NAMES,
+            )
+        )
+
+    def test_admin_can_ptz_any_camera_with_config(self):
+        self.assertTrue(
+            _check_ws_authorization(
+                "garage/ptz",
+                "admin",
+                self.DEFAULT_SEPARATOR,
+                self.ROLES_CONFIG,
+                self.CAMERA_NAMES,
+            )
+        )
+
+    def test_ipc_topic_still_blocked_with_camera_access(self):
+        # IPC topics are blocked unconditionally, even with camera access
+        self.assertFalse(
+            _check_ws_authorization(
+                UPDATE_CAMERA_ACTIVITY,
+                "viewer",
+                self.DEFAULT_SEPARATOR,
+                self.ROLES_CONFIG,
+                self.CAMERA_NAMES,
+            )
+        )
+
 
 if __name__ == "__main__":
     unittest.main()

frigate/util/services.py

@@ -556,7 +556,7 @@ def get_jetson_stats() -> Optional[dict[int, dict]]:
     return results
 
 
-def _go2rtc_arbitrary_exec_allowed() -> bool:
+def is_go2rtc_arbitrary_exec_allowed() -> bool:
     """Read the GO2RTC_ALLOW_ARBITRARY_EXEC override from env, docker
     secrets, or the Home Assistant add-on options file."""
     raw: Optional[str] = None
@@ -588,7 +588,7 @@ def is_restricted_go2rtc_source(stream_source: str) -> bool:
     and the GO2RTC_ALLOW_ARBITRARY_EXEC override is not set."""
     if not stream_source.strip().startswith(("echo:", "expr:", "exec:")):
         return False
-    return not _go2rtc_arbitrary_exec_allowed()
+    return not is_go2rtc_arbitrary_exec_allowed()
 
 
 def ffprobe_stream(ffmpeg, path: str, detailed: bool = False) -> sp.CompletedProcess: