Compare commits

...
Author SHA1 Message Date
Josh Hawkins e2aa0ee29a remove path data from thumbnail payloads 2026-08-23 11:12:46 -05:00
Josh Hawkins 9c7e32d0d6 don't let a slow websocket client block publishers 2026-08-23 11:10:05 -05:00
Nicolas MowenandGitHub ad79e666eb API Consistency / Security Fixes (#24057)
CI / AMD64 Build (push) Canceled after 0s
CI / ARM Build (push) Canceled after 0s
CI / Jetson Jetpack 6 (push) Canceled after 0s
CI / ARM Extra Build (push) Canceled after 0s
CI / Synaptics Build (push) Canceled after 0s
CI / AMD64 Extra Build (push) Canceled after 0s
CI / Assemble and push default build (push) Canceled after 0s
* Make review user read status consistent with other APIs

* Validate URLs for web push endpoint

* Validate the role for a custom viewer, rate limit password changing

* Cleanup
2026-08-22 11:08:24 -05:00
Nicolas MowenandGitHub fc79aeab5e Fix review summary report analysis creation to be scoped for users with full camera access only (#24056)
* Fix review summary analysis

* Add ability to scope based on full camera access
2026-08-22 11:06:01 -05:00
12 changed files with 646 additions and 17 deletions
+5 -5
View File
@@ -2308,15 +2308,15 @@ paths:
$ref: '#/components/schemas/HTTPValidationError'
security:
- frigateUserAuth: []
x-required-role: any
description: '**Access:** Any authenticated user.'
x-required-role: camera
description: '**Access:** Authenticated user with access to the referenced camera.'
/review/summarize/start/{start_ts}/end/{end_ts}:
post:
tags:
- Review
summary: Generate Review Summary
description: |-
**Access:** Admin role required.
**Access:** Authenticated user with access to all cameras.
Use GenAI to summarize review items over a period of time.
operationId:
@@ -2347,8 +2347,8 @@ paths:
schema:
$ref: '#/components/schemas/HTTPValidationError'
security:
- frigateAdminAuth: []
x-required-role: admin
- frigateUserAuth: []
x-required-role: all_cameras
/:
get:
tags:
+25 -3
View File
@@ -971,6 +971,7 @@ def delete_user(request: Request, username: str):
summary="Update user password",
description="Updates a user's password. Users can only change their own password unless they have admin role. Requires the current password to verify identity for non-admin users. Password must be at least 12 characters long. If user changes their own password, a new JWT cookie is automatically issued.",
)
@limiter.limit(limit_value=rateLimiter.get_limit)
async def update_password(
request: Request,
username: str,
@@ -984,10 +985,11 @@ async def update_password(
current_username = current_user.get("username")
current_role = current_user.get("role")
# viewers can only change their own password
if current_role == "viewer" and current_username != username:
# Only admins may target another account. This has to cover every non-admin
# role rather than just viewer, since custom roles are arbitrary names
if current_role != "admin" and current_username != username:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=403, detail="Viewers can only update their own password"
status_code=403, detail="Users can only update their own password"
)
HASH_ITERATIONS = request.app.frigate_config.auth.hash_iterations
@@ -1251,3 +1253,23 @@ async def get_allowed_cameras_for_filter(request: Request):
all_camera_names = set(request.app.frigate_config.cameras.keys())
roles_dict = request.app.frigate_config.auth.roles
return User.get_allowed_cameras(role, roles_dict, all_camera_names)
async def require_full_camera_access(
request: Request,
allowed_cameras: list[str] = Depends(get_allowed_cameras_for_filter),
):
"""Dependency for endpoints returning data that spans every camera.
Some responses cannot be meaningfully scoped to a subset of cameras, so
rather than filter them the endpoint is limited to callers who can already
see every camera. Admin and viewer always qualify; a custom role qualifies
only when its camera list covers all configured cameras.
"""
all_camera_names = set(request.app.frigate_config.cameras.keys())
if not all_camera_names.issubset(allowed_cameras):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=403,
detail="Access to all cameras is required for this endpoint",
)
+102
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,10 @@
"""Notification apis."""
import ipaddress
import logging
import os
from typing import Any
from urllib.parse import urlparse
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, Request
@@ -19,6 +21,95 @@ logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
router = APIRouter(tags=[Tags.notifications])
# Push endpoints are opaque URLs but stay well under this in practice
MAX_ENDPOINT_LENGTH = 2048
# Suffixes that only ever resolve on the local network
INTERNAL_HOST_SUFFIXES = (".local", ".localdomain", ".internal", ".home.arpa")
def _validate_push_endpoint(endpoint: Any) -> str | None:
"""Return a reason the endpoint is unusable, or None when it is valid.
Subscriptions are issued by the browser vendor's push service, so a valid
endpoint is always a public https URL. Anything else is either a broken
registration or an attempt to aim the notification sender somewhere it
should not reach.
"""
if not isinstance(endpoint, str) or not endpoint:
return "endpoint must be a url"
if len(endpoint) > MAX_ENDPOINT_LENGTH:
return "endpoint is too long"
try:
parsed = urlparse(endpoint)
port = parsed.port
except ValueError:
return "endpoint is not a valid url"
if parsed.scheme != "https":
return "endpoint must use https"
if parsed.username or parsed.password:
return "endpoint must not include credentials"
if port is not None and port != 443:
return "endpoint must use the default https port"
hostname = parsed.hostname
if not hostname:
return "endpoint must include a hostname"
try:
address = ipaddress.ip_address(hostname)
except ValueError:
address = None
if address is not None:
# A push service is never reachable at an address only this network can
# route, so anything non-global is a misconfiguration at best
if not address.is_global:
return "endpoint must not use a private address"
elif hostname == "localhost" or "." not in hostname:
return "endpoint must use a fully qualified hostname"
elif hostname.endswith(INTERNAL_HOST_SUFFIXES):
return "endpoint must not use an internal hostname"
# The subscription token lives in the path, and webpush.py assumes there is
# a separator after the host when it builds the VAPID audience
if len(parsed.path) <= 1:
return "endpoint must include a subscription path"
return None
def _validate_subscription(sub: Any) -> str | None:
"""Return a reason the subscription is unusable, or None when it is valid."""
if not isinstance(sub, dict):
return "subscription must be an object"
reason = _validate_push_endpoint(sub.get("endpoint"))
if reason:
return reason
keys = sub.get("keys")
if not isinstance(keys, dict):
return "subscription must include keys"
# WebPusher raises on a missing key, which would break every send for the
# user rather than just this registration
for name in ("p256dh", "auth"):
value = keys.get(name)
if not isinstance(value, str) or not value:
return f"subscription keys must include {name}"
return None
@router.get(
"/notifications/pubkey",
@@ -71,6 +162,17 @@ def register_notifications(request: Request, body: dict = None):
status_code=400,
)
reason = _validate_subscription(sub)
if reason:
logger.warning(
"Rejected notification registration for %s: %s", username, reason
)
return JSONResponse(
content={"success": False, "message": f"Invalid subscription: {reason}"},
status_code=400,
)
try:
User.update(notification_tokens=User.notification_tokens.append(sub)).where(
User.username == username
+8 -1
View File
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ from frigate.api.auth import (
get_allowed_cameras_for_filter,
get_current_user,
require_camera_access,
require_full_camera_access,
require_role,
)
from frigate.api.defs.query.review_query_parameters import (
@@ -709,6 +710,7 @@ async def get_review(request: Request, review_id: str):
dependencies=[Depends(allow_any_authenticated())],
)
async def set_not_reviewed(
request: Request,
review_id: str,
current_user: dict = Depends(get_current_user),
):
@@ -727,6 +729,8 @@ async def set_not_reviewed(
status_code=404,
)
await require_camera_access(review.camera, request=request)
try:
user_review = UserReviewStatus.get(
UserReviewStatus.user_id == user_id,
@@ -743,9 +747,12 @@ async def set_not_reviewed(
)
# Intentionally not camera scoped, as the summary correlates each flagged event
# with overlapping activity on other cameras. Restricted to callers who can
# already see every camera, so the unscoped query discloses nothing.
@router.post(
"/review/summarize/start/{start_ts}/end/{end_ts}",
dependencies=[Depends(require_role(["admin"]))],
dependencies=[Depends(require_full_camera_access)],
description="Use GenAI to summarize review items over a period of time.",
)
def generate_review_summary(request: Request, start_ts: float, end_ts: float):
-1
View File
@@ -396,7 +396,6 @@ class CameraState:
"attributes": new_obj.obj_data["attributes"],
"current_estimated_speed": 0,
"velocity_angle": 0,
"path_data": [],
"recognized_license_plate": None,
"recognized_license_plate_score": None,
}
+63 -4
View File
@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@
import errno
import json
import logging
import queue
import socket
import threading
from collections.abc import Callable
from typing import Any
@@ -74,6 +76,9 @@ _WS_VIEWER_TOPICS = frozenset(
# Camera-scoped command topics a camera-authorized (non-admin) user may send.
_WS_CAMERA_COMMAND_TOPICS = frozenset({"ptz"})
# Max outbound messages waiting on a client's writer thread.
WS_MAX_PENDING_MESSAGES = 256
def _check_ws_authorization(
topic: str,
@@ -446,6 +451,63 @@ def _materialize_for_ws(
class WebSocket(WebSocket_): # type: ignore[misc]
def __init__(self, *args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> None:
super().__init__(*args, **kwargs)
self._send_queue: queue.Queue[tuple[Any, bool] | None] = queue.Queue(
maxsize=WS_MAX_PENDING_MESSAGES
)
self._writer: threading.Thread | None = None
self._aborted = False
def opened(self) -> None:
# every client gets its own writer so a client that stops reading only
# blocks itself, never the thread that called publish()
self._writer = threading.Thread(
target=self._drain_send_queue, name="ws_writer", daemon=True
)
self._writer.start()
def send(self, payload: Any, binary: bool = False) -> None:
try:
self._send_queue.put_nowait((payload, binary))
except queue.Full:
self._abort("Websocket client is not keeping up, disconnecting it")
def _drain_send_queue(self) -> None:
while True:
item = self._send_queue.get()
if item is None or self.terminated or self.sock is None:
return
try:
super().send(*item)
except Exception:
self._abort()
return
def _abort(self, reason: str | None = None) -> None:
# publish() keeps hitting a full queue until the manager thread removes
# the connection, so only act (and log) the first time
if self._aborted:
return
self._aborted = True
if reason:
logger.warning(reason)
# shutdown rather than close so the ws4py manager thread sees EOF and
# runs its normal unregister/terminate; this also unblocks a stuck sendall
sock = self.sock
if sock is not None:
try:
sock.shutdown(socket.SHUT_RDWR)
except OSError:
pass
def closed(self, code: int, reason: str | None = None) -> None:
try:
self._send_queue.put_nowait(None)
except queue.Full:
pass
def unhandled_error(self, error: Any) -> None:
"""
Handles the unfriendly socket closures on the server side
@@ -580,10 +642,7 @@ class WebSocketClient(Communicator):
)
if message is None:
continue
try:
ws.send(message)
except (ConnectionResetError, BrokenPipeError, ValueError):
pass
ws.send(message)
def stop(self) -> None:
if self.websocket_server is not None:
@@ -440,3 +440,68 @@ class TestGo2rtcStreamAccess(BaseTestHttp):
f"limited_user should be denied on alias back_door_main; "
f"got {resp.status_code}"
)
class TestReviewSummaryAccess(BaseTestHttp):
"""Tests for POST /review/summarize/start/{start_ts}/end/{end_ts}.
The summary correlates each flagged event with overlapping activity on
other cameras, so it is gated on full camera access rather than scoped to
the caller's cameras. These tests pin that decision so the dependency is
not loosened without first scoping the query.
GenAI is not configured in unit tests, so an authorized request returns 400
while an unauthorized one is rejected with 403 before the handler runs.
"""
def setUp(self):
super().setUp([Event, ReviewSegment, Recordings])
self.minimal_config = _MULTI_CAMERA_CONFIG
self.app = super().create_app()
def tearDown(self):
self.app.dependency_overrides.clear()
super().tearDown()
def _summarize(self, allowed_cameras: list[str]):
async def mock_cameras(request: Request):
return allowed_cameras
self.app.dependency_overrides[get_allowed_cameras_for_filter] = mock_cameras
with AuthTestClient(self.app) as client:
return client.post("/review/summarize/start/0/end/9999999999")
def _assert_allowed(self, resp):
assert resp.status_code not in (401, 403), (
f"Caller should not be blocked; got {resp.status_code}"
)
def test_partial_camera_access_blocked(self):
assert self._summarize(["front_door"]).status_code == 403
def test_no_camera_access_blocked(self):
assert self._summarize([]).status_code == 403
def test_full_camera_access_allowed(self):
# Covers admin and viewer, which always resolve to every camera, and a
# custom role whose list happens to name them all.
self._assert_allowed(self._summarize(["front_door", "back_door"]))
def _summarize_as_role(self, role: str):
"""Summarize using the real role to allowed-cameras resolution."""
self.app.dependency_overrides.pop(get_allowed_cameras_for_filter, None)
with AuthTestClient(self.app) as client:
return client.post(
"/review/summarize/start/0/end/9999999999",
headers={"remote-user": "test", "remote-role": role},
)
def test_viewer_role_allowed(self):
# viewer is never camera restricted, so it resolves to every camera.
self._assert_allowed(self._summarize_as_role("viewer"))
def test_admin_role_allowed(self):
self._assert_allowed(self._summarize_as_role("admin"))
def test_restricted_role_blocked(self):
assert self._summarize_as_role("limited_user").status_code == 403
+113
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
"""Tests for password change authorization."""
from fastapi import Request
from frigate.api.auth import get_current_user, hash_password, verify_password
from frigate.models import Event, Recordings, ReviewSegment, User
from frigate.test.http_api.base_http_test import AuthTestClient, BaseTestHttp
# Config carrying a custom role, which is the class of user the literal
# "viewer" check used to let through.
_CUSTOM_ROLE_CONFIG = {
"mqtt": {"host": "mqtt"},
"auth": {"roles": {"neighbor": ["front_door"]}, "hash_iterations": 10},
"cameras": {
"front_door": {
"ffmpeg": {
"inputs": [{"path": "rtsp://10.0.0.1:554/video", "roles": ["detect"]}]
},
"detect": {"height": 1080, "width": 1920, "fps": 5},
},
},
}
ADMIN_PASSWORD = "admin-real-password"
NEW_PASSWORD = "AttackerChosenPassword123!"
class TestUpdatePasswordAccess(BaseTestHttp):
def setUp(self):
super().setUp([Event, ReviewSegment, Recordings, User])
self.minimal_config = _CUSTOM_ROLE_CONFIG
self.app = super().create_app()
User.insert(
username="admin",
password_hash=hash_password(ADMIN_PASSWORD, iterations=10),
role="admin",
notification_tokens=[],
).execute()
async def mock_get_current_user(request: Request):
return {
"username": request.headers.get("remote-user"),
"role": request.headers.get("remote-role"),
}
self.app.dependency_overrides[get_current_user] = mock_get_current_user
def tearDown(self):
self.app.dependency_overrides.clear()
super().tearDown()
def _change_password(self, actor: str, role: str, target: str, old_password: str):
with AuthTestClient(self.app) as client:
return client.put(
f"/users/{target}/password",
json={"password": NEW_PASSWORD, "old_password": old_password},
headers={"remote-user": actor, "remote-role": role},
)
def _admin_password_unchanged(self) -> bool:
return verify_password(ADMIN_PASSWORD, User.get_by_id("admin").password_hash)
def test_custom_role_cannot_target_another_account(self):
resp = self._change_password("neighbor", "neighbor", "admin", "wrong-guess")
assert resp.status_code == 403
assert self._admin_password_unchanged()
def test_custom_role_cannot_target_another_account_with_correct_password(self):
# The 403 must land before old_password is checked, so knowing the
# target's password is not a way through
resp = self._change_password("neighbor", "neighbor", "admin", ADMIN_PASSWORD)
assert resp.status_code == 403
assert self._admin_password_unchanged()
def test_viewer_cannot_target_another_account(self):
resp = self._change_password("viewer_user", "viewer", "admin", ADMIN_PASSWORD)
assert resp.status_code == 403
assert self._admin_password_unchanged()
def test_admin_can_target_another_account(self):
User.insert(
username="neighbor",
password_hash=hash_password("neighbor-password", iterations=10),
role="neighbor",
notification_tokens=[],
).execute()
resp = self._change_password("admin", "admin", "neighbor", "")
assert resp.status_code == 200
def test_non_admin_can_change_own_password(self):
User.insert(
username="neighbor",
password_hash=hash_password("neighbor-password", iterations=10),
role="neighbor",
notification_tokens=[],
).execute()
resp = self._change_password(
"neighbor", "neighbor", "neighbor", "neighbor-password"
)
assert resp.status_code == 200
def test_non_admin_own_password_still_requires_old_password(self):
User.insert(
username="neighbor",
password_hash=hash_password("neighbor-password", iterations=10),
role="neighbor",
notification_tokens=[],
).execute()
resp = self._change_password("neighbor", "neighbor", "neighbor", "wrong-guess")
assert resp.status_code == 401
+150
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
"""Tests for push notification subscription validation."""
import unittest
from frigate.api.notification import _validate_push_endpoint, _validate_subscription
VALID_ENDPOINTS = [
"https://fcm.googleapis.com/fcm/send/dGhpcy1pcy1hLXRva2Vu",
"https://updates.push.services.mozilla.com/wpush/v2/dGhpcy1pcy1hLXRva2Vu",
"https://web.push.apple.com/dGhpcy1pcy1hLXRva2Vu",
"https://wns2-by3p.notify.windows.com/w/?token=dGhpcy1pcy1hLXRva2Vu",
"https://fcm.googleapis.com:443/fcm/send/dGhpcy1pcy1hLXRva2Vu",
]
def _subscription(endpoint: str) -> dict:
return {
"endpoint": endpoint,
"keys": {"p256dh": "cHVibGljLWtleQ", "auth": "YXV0aC1zZWNyZXQ"},
}
class TestValidatePushEndpoint(unittest.TestCase):
def test_accepts_real_push_service_endpoints(self):
for endpoint in VALID_ENDPOINTS:
with self.subTest(endpoint=endpoint):
self.assertIsNone(_validate_push_endpoint(endpoint))
def test_rejects_http(self):
self.assertIsNotNone(
_validate_push_endpoint("http://fcm.googleapis.com/fcm/send/token")
)
def test_rejects_non_http_schemes(self):
for endpoint in (
"file:///etc/passwd",
"ftp://example.com/token",
"//example.com/token",
):
with self.subTest(endpoint=endpoint):
self.assertIsNotNone(_validate_push_endpoint(endpoint))
def test_rejects_localhost(self):
for endpoint in (
"https://localhost/token",
"https://localhost:443/token",
"https://127.0.0.1/token",
"https://[::1]/token",
):
with self.subTest(endpoint=endpoint):
self.assertIsNotNone(_validate_push_endpoint(endpoint))
def test_rejects_private_addresses(self):
for endpoint in (
"https://192.168.1.10/token",
"https://10.0.0.5/token",
"https://172.16.0.1/token",
"https://169.254.169.254/token",
"https://0.0.0.0/token",
):
with self.subTest(endpoint=endpoint):
self.assertIsNotNone(_validate_push_endpoint(endpoint))
def test_rejects_internal_hostnames(self):
for endpoint in (
"https://frigate/token",
"https://nas.local/token",
"https://push.internal/token",
"https://host.home.arpa/token",
):
with self.subTest(endpoint=endpoint):
self.assertIsNotNone(_validate_push_endpoint(endpoint))
def test_rejects_non_default_port(self):
self.assertIsNotNone(
_validate_push_endpoint("https://fcm.googleapis.com:8080/fcm/send/token")
)
def test_rejects_embedded_credentials(self):
self.assertIsNotNone(
_validate_push_endpoint(
"https://user:pass@fcm.googleapis.com/fcm/send/token"
)
)
def test_rejects_endpoint_without_path(self):
for endpoint in ("https://fcm.googleapis.com", "https://fcm.googleapis.com/"):
with self.subTest(endpoint=endpoint):
self.assertIsNotNone(_validate_push_endpoint(endpoint))
def test_rejects_endpoint_that_breaks_audience_parsing(self):
# webpush.py locates the host by searching for a separator after index
# 10, which raises ValueError when the url has no path at all
endpoint = "https://fcm.googleapis.com"
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
endpoint.index("/", 10)
self.assertIsNotNone(_validate_push_endpoint(endpoint))
def test_rejects_missing_or_non_string_endpoint(self):
for endpoint in (None, "", 5, {"url": "https://example.com/token"}):
with self.subTest(endpoint=endpoint):
self.assertIsNotNone(_validate_push_endpoint(endpoint))
def test_rejects_overlong_endpoint(self):
self.assertIsNotNone(
_validate_push_endpoint(f"https://fcm.googleapis.com/{'a' * 4096}")
)
class TestValidateSubscription(unittest.TestCase):
def test_accepts_valid_subscription(self):
self.assertIsNone(_validate_subscription(_subscription(VALID_ENDPOINTS[0])))
def test_accepts_extra_fields_sent_by_the_browser(self):
sub = _subscription(VALID_ENDPOINTS[0])
sub["expirationTime"] = None
self.assertIsNone(_validate_subscription(sub))
def test_rejects_non_object(self):
for sub in ("https://fcm.googleapis.com/fcm/send/token", ["endpoint"], 5):
with self.subTest(sub=sub):
self.assertIsNotNone(_validate_subscription(sub))
def test_rejects_bad_endpoint(self):
self.assertIsNotNone(
_validate_subscription(_subscription("https://localhost/t"))
)
def test_rejects_missing_keys(self):
sub = _subscription(VALID_ENDPOINTS[0])
del sub["keys"]
self.assertIsNotNone(_validate_subscription(sub))
def test_rejects_incomplete_keys(self):
for keys in (
{"p256dh": "cHVibGljLWtleQ"},
{"auth": "YXV0aC1zZWNyZXQ"},
{"p256dh": "cHVibGljLWtleQ", "auth": ""},
{"p256dh": None, "auth": "YXV0aC1zZWNyZXQ"},
):
with self.subTest(keys=keys):
sub = _subscription(VALID_ENDPOINTS[0])
sub["keys"] = keys
self.assertIsNotNone(_validate_subscription(sub))
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
+107
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
"""Outbound websocket sends must never block the thread calling publish()."""
import socket
import threading
import unittest
from frigate.comms.ws import WS_MAX_PENDING_MESSAGES, WebSocket
class _FakeSock:
"""Socket stand-in; ``block`` makes sendall hang like a client that stopped reading."""
def __init__(self, block: bool = False) -> None:
self.block = block
self.released = threading.Event()
self.shutdown_called = threading.Event()
self.frames: list[bytes] = []
def sendall(self, data: bytes) -> None:
if self.block and not self.released.is_set():
self.released.wait(timeout=10)
raise BrokenPipeError()
self.frames.append(data)
def shutdown(self, how: int) -> None:
assert how == socket.SHUT_RDWR
self.shutdown_called.set()
self.released.set()
def close(self) -> None:
pass
def fileno(self) -> int:
return 99
def _wait_for(predicate, timeout: float = 2.0) -> bool:
deadline = threading.Event()
for _ in range(int(timeout / 0.01)):
if predicate():
return True
deadline.wait(0.01)
return predicate()
class TestWebSocketSendQueue(unittest.TestCase):
def _open(self, sock: _FakeSock) -> WebSocket:
ws = WebSocket(sock)
ws.opened()
return ws
def test_stalled_client_does_not_block_publisher(self):
sock = _FakeSock(block=True)
ws = self._open(sock)
def publish_many():
for i in range(WS_MAX_PENDING_MESSAGES + 5):
ws.send(f"message {i}")
publisher = threading.Thread(target=publish_many, daemon=True)
publisher.start()
publisher.join(timeout=2.0)
self.assertFalse(publisher.is_alive(), "publish() blocked on a stalled client")
self.assertTrue(
sock.shutdown_called.wait(timeout=2.0),
"a client that cannot keep up should be disconnected",
)
def test_overflow_warns_and_shuts_down_once(self):
sock = _FakeSock(block=True)
ws = self._open(sock)
shutdown_calls = []
original_shutdown = sock.shutdown
sock.shutdown = lambda how: (shutdown_calls.append(how), original_shutdown(how))
with self.assertLogs("frigate.comms.ws", level="WARNING") as logs:
# keep publishing after overflow, as the dispatcher does until the
# manager thread removes the connection
for i in range(WS_MAX_PENDING_MESSAGES * 3):
ws.send(f"message {i}")
self.assertEqual(len(logs.output), 1)
self.assertEqual(len(shutdown_calls), 1)
def test_messages_delivered_in_order(self):
sock = _FakeSock()
ws = self._open(sock)
for i in range(3):
ws.send(f"message {i}")
self.assertTrue(_wait_for(lambda: len(sock.frames) == 3))
for i, frame in enumerate(sock.frames):
self.assertIn(f"message {i}".encode(), frame)
self.assertFalse(sock.shutdown_called.is_set())
def test_closed_stops_writer_thread(self):
sock = _FakeSock()
ws = self._open(sock)
writer = ws._writer
ws.closed(1000, "bye")
writer.join(timeout=2.0)
self.assertFalse(writer.is_alive())
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
-1
View File
@@ -164,7 +164,6 @@ class TrackedObject:
"attributes": obj_data["attributes"],
"current_estimated_speed": self.current_estimated_speed,
"velocity_angle": self.velocity_angle,
"path_data": self.path_data.copy(),
"recognized_license_plate": obj_data.get(
"recognized_license_plate"
),
+8 -2
View File
@@ -94,6 +94,7 @@ SPEC_SERVERS = [
PUBLIC = "public"
AUTHENTICATED = "any"
CAMERA = "camera"
ALL_CAMERAS = "all_cameras"
ADMIN = "admin"
ADMIN_SCHEME = "frigateAdminAuth"
@@ -128,6 +129,7 @@ ACCESS_NOTES = {
PUBLIC: "**Access:** Public — no authentication required.",
AUTHENTICATED: "**Access:** Any authenticated user.",
CAMERA: "**Access:** Authenticated user with access to the referenced camera.",
ALL_CAMERAS: "**Access:** Authenticated user with access to all cameras.",
ADMIN: "**Access:** Admin role required.",
}
@@ -197,6 +199,8 @@ def _route_markers(route: APIRoute) -> tuple[set[str], list[str] | None]:
pass
elif name in ("require_camera_access", "require_go2rtc_stream_access"):
markers.add(CAMERA)
elif name == "require_full_camera_access":
markers.add(ALL_CAMERAS)
elif "auth_checker" in qualname:
markers.add(AUTHENTICATED)
elif "public_checker" in qualname:
@@ -254,6 +258,8 @@ def _classify_base(
# Explicit route-level markers win, in order of specificity.
if ADMIN in markers:
return ADMIN, admin_roles or ["admin"], None
if ALL_CAMERAS in markers:
return ALL_CAMERAS, None, None
if CAMERA in markers:
return CAMERA, None, None
if AUTHENTICATED in markers:
@@ -337,8 +343,8 @@ def security_for(level: str) -> list:
return []
if level == ADMIN:
return [{ADMIN_SCHEME: []}]
# AUTHENTICATED and CAMERA both require any authenticated session; the
# camera-specific scoping is conveyed in the note and x-required-role.
# AUTHENTICATED, CAMERA and ALL_CAMERAS all require any authenticated
# session; the camera scoping is conveyed in the note and x-required-role.
return [{USER_SCHEME: []}]