Files
frigate/frigate/test
Josh HawkinsandGitHub 11f8786459
CI / AMD64 Build (push) Canceled after 0s
CI / ARM Build (push) Canceled after 0s
CI / Jetson Jetpack 6 (push) Canceled after 0s
CI / AMD64 Extra Build (push) Canceled after 0s
CI / ARM Extra Build (push) Canceled after 0s
CI / Synaptics Build (push) Canceled after 0s
CI / Assemble and push default build (push) Canceled after 0s
sanitize user-supplied path components (#23990)
sanitize_filename leaves ".." intact and collapses variants like "..:" and "..*" to "..", so filesystem paths built from face names, classification model/category names, image ids, and trigger data could escape their base directory. Route every such site through new frigate/util/path.py helpers (safe_join, sanitize_path_component, sanitize_contained_path), which reject traversal and verify containment.

Worst case was DELETE /classification/{name}, which rmtree'd /media/frigate and /config while returning 200.

Important to note that all affected endpoints already require admin permission, so this sould be considered hardening rather than fixing exploitable code.
2026-08-13 21:59:46 -05:00
..
2021-01-26 21:40:33 -06:00
2026-07-13 19:55:00 -08:00
2026-03-20 08:50:58 -05:00
2026-03-24 13:53:39 -06:00
2023-10-18 18:21:52 -05:00