frigate

sanitize_filename leaves ".." intact and collapses variants like "..:" and "..*" to "..", so filesystem paths built from face names, classification model/category names, image ids, and trigger data could escape their base directory. Route every such site through new frigate/util/path.py helpers (safe_join, sanitize_path_component, sanitize_contained_path), which reject traversal and verify containment.

Worst case was DELETE /classification/{name}, which rmtree'd /media/frigate and /config while returning 200.

Important to note that all affected endpoints already require admin permission, so this sould be considered hardening rather than fixing exploitable code.

2026-08-13 21:59:46 -05:00

onnx

Convert face crops to RGB before embedding (#23712 )

2026-07-13 16:45:29 -06:00

__init__.py

sanitize user-supplied path components (#23990 )

2026-08-13 21:59:46 -05:00

embeddings.py

fix: update correct metric in batch_embed_thumbnail (#22501 )

2026-03-16 17:33:40 -06:00

genai_embedding.py

Support using GenAI for embeddings / semantic search (#22323 )