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frigate/.github/workflows/ci.yml
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Josh HawkinsandNicolas Mowen c004d0a1c9 Container security hardening (phase 1) (#24061)
* Verify s6-overlay downloads against pinned checksums

* Verify go2rtc download against pinned checksums

The v1.9.14 release publishes no checksums file, just the bare per-platform binaries, so these digests come from a one-time fetch rather than upstream. That pins the artifact against later substitution, which is the realistic threat for a version we stay on for months, but it does not verify the original download. The stage moves from `ADD --link` to a script because `ADD --checksum` can't express an architecture-dependent URL.

* Verify main image downloads against pinned checksums

Covers everything the main image downloads on the default path: tempio, the hailort runtime tarball and wheel, the six ffmpeg builds, the libedgetpu deb, and the thirteen Intel driver debs. The hailort tarball was streamed straight into `tar`, which can't be verified before extraction, so it downloads to `/tmp` first. The three ffmpeg blocks per arch collapse into one `install_ffmpeg` helper since they only differed by URL and install dir, and the Intel debs go through a `fetch_intel_deb` helper for the same reason.

The Intel debs are the ones that mattered most here. They're installed as root with `dpkg` on the default amd64 path and had no verification at all. compute-runtime publishes a `ww<week>.sum` asset with every release and npu-driver published `checksum.sha256` on v1.19.0, so those eight digests came from upstream rather than from us. intel-graphics-compiler and level-zero publish none, so those five and everything else here come from a one-time fetch, which pins the artifact against later substitution but doesn't verify the original download. The comment above the map says which is which and how to refresh them, since npu-driver has stopped publishing sums since v1.19.0 and that provenance won't survive the next bump.

Still unpinned: `get-pip.py`, which is a rolling URL where a digest would just break the build on pypa's next edit, and the per-variant artifacts for Axera, Synaptics, and Jetson. apt repositories are out of scope since apt already verifies signatures.

* Restrict generated TLS key permissions

OpenSSL 3.x already writes the key at 600 on its own, so this pins the guarantee rather than fixing an observed leak: the mode no longer depends on the openssl version or the umask the service happens to start with. Only the generated pair is touched. User-mounted certs take the other branch and are never chmod'd, which matters when they're mounted read-only.

* Add security headers and server_tokens off

Adds `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` and `Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin`, and turns off nginx version disclosure.

No `X-Frame-Options` and no CSP `frame-ancestors`. HA's Webpage card and iframe panels frame Frigate's own address cross-origin, and either header would break them silently with nothing in Frigate's logs to explain it. Ingress is same-origin and would survive `SAMEORIGIN`, but Frigate can't tell the two apart from inside the container. `security_headers.conf` is a plain file in the image rather than a generated one, so anyone who does want framing restrictions can bind-mount it.

`add_header` doesn't inherit into a block that declares its own, so the include goes in per block, all nine of them, including the four nested static-asset locations that serve the JS bundles. Those are the ones nosniff actually matters for.

The run script now reads `get_nginx_settings.py` once into a variable instead of shelling out per template. That script imports the frigate config machinery, which is noticeable on an SBC.

Not fixed here: `listen.conf` is included at server level and carries `Strict-Transport-Security`, so those same nine blocks already drop HSTS under TLS today. Folding it into this file would change existing TLS behavior on nine paths, so it needs its own PR.

* Restrict go2rtc config file permissions

* Log failed login attempts with source address

Failed logins returned a bare 401 and left nothing behind, so credential stuffing was invisible unless you were already watching nginx access logs. Both failure branches now log a warning with the attempted username and the client address.

The address comes from `get_remote_addr()`, the same helper the login rate limiter keys on, so the two agree on who the client is and the trusted-proxy handling is consistent. Logging a raw `x-forwarded-for` instead would let an attacker forge the source address in the very log line meant to catch them.

The response is unchanged and identical either way. Which factor failed is only visible in the log, never to the client, and the password is never logged.

* Recommend least-privilege container options in install docs

The compose generator pushed `privileged: true` into every file it produced, no matter what hardware you picked, and it's the default tab on the install page so it's what most people copy. It now emits `security_opt: no-new-privileges:true` instead, and only adds `privileged: true` for hardware that actually needs it, with the reason inline. MemryX is the only one today, since it needs to reach the max-manager. Rockchip and Synaptics only want privileged during initial setup and their documented end state is device mappings, so neither gets it.

`no-new-privileges` merges into the same `security_opt` block as any device-specific entries, so Rockchip still gets its `apparmor=unconfined` and `systempaths=unconfined` without a duplicate key.

The static example now has `privileged` commented out, and there's a short section on the options worth adding, with a note that `cap_drop: ALL` breaks `telemetry.stats.network_bandwidth` since nethogs needs NET_ADMIN/NET_RAW.

* Add amd64 container smoke test to CI

Boots the built amd64 image against a minimal config and asserts the two security headers, that the Server header no longer carries a version, that no frame-ancestors is present, that nginx accepts its own config, and the two file modes. This is also the harness the rest of the hardening work extends.

The two negative assertions are written as `if grep; then exit 1; fi` rather than `! grep`. Bash exempts a negated command from `set -e`, so the `!` form would have passed even with the version and frame-ancestors both present, which is the opposite of what a regression net is for.
2026-09-12 07:30:04 -06:00

282 lines
9.5 KiB
YAML

name: CI
on:
workflow_dispatch:
push:
branches:
- dev
- master
paths-ignore:
- "docs/**"
# only run the latest commit to avoid cache overwrites
concurrency:
group: ${{ github.ref }}
cancel-in-progress: true
env:
PYTHON_VERSION: 3.11
jobs:
amd64_build:
runs-on: ubuntu-22.04
name: AMD64 Build
steps:
- name: Check out code
uses: actions/checkout@v6
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Set up QEMU and Buildx
id: setup
uses: ./.github/actions/setup
with:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
- name: Build and push amd64 standard build
uses: docker/build-push-action@v7
with:
context: .
file: docker/main/Dockerfile
push: true
platforms: linux/amd64
target: frigate
tags: ${{ steps.setup.outputs.image-name }}-amd64
cache-from: type=registry,ref=${{ steps.setup.outputs.cache-name }}-amd64
cache-to: type=registry,ref=${{ steps.setup.outputs.cache-name }}-amd64,mode=max
smoke_test:
runs-on: ubuntu-22.04
name: AMD64 Smoke Test
needs:
- amd64_build
steps:
- name: Check out code
uses: actions/checkout@v6
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Set up QEMU and Buildx
id: setup
uses: ./.github/actions/setup
with:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
- name: Start container
run: |
mkdir -p /tmp/frigate-config
printf 'mqtt:\n enabled: false\ncameras: {}\n' > /tmp/frigate-config/config.yml
docker run -d --name frigate --shm-size 256m \
-v /tmp/frigate-config:/config \
-p 5000:5000 -p 8971:8971 \
${{ steps.setup.outputs.image-name }}-amd64
- name: Wait for API
run: |
for i in $(seq 1 60); do
curl -fs http://127.0.0.1:5000/api/version && exit 0
sleep 5
done
echo "API never came up"; docker logs frigate; exit 1
- name: Assert security headers and permissions
run: |
headers=$(curl -ksI https://127.0.0.1:8971/)
echo "$headers"
echo "$headers" | grep -qi "x-content-type-options: nosniff"
echo "$headers" | grep -qi "referrer-policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin"
# server_tokens off: Server header must not include a version.
# written as an if rather than "! grep", because bash exempts a
# negated command from set -e and the assertion would never fail
if echo "$headers" | grep -qiE "^server: nginx/[0-9]"; then
echo "Server header leaks the nginx version; server_tokens is not off"
exit 1
fi
# Frigate never ships frame-ancestors: HA's Webpage card and iframe
# panels frame it cross-origin and it would break them silently
if echo "$headers" | grep -qi "frame-ancestors"; then
echo "response carries frame-ancestors, which breaks cross-origin iframe embedding"
exit 1
fi
docker exec frigate /usr/local/nginx/sbin/nginx -t
docker exec frigate stat -c %a /etc/letsencrypt/live/frigate/privkey.pem | grep -qx 600
docker exec frigate stat -c %a /dev/shm/go2rtc.yaml | grep -qx 640
- name: Teardown
if: always()
run: docker rm -f frigate || true
arm64_build:
runs-on: ubuntu-22.04-arm
name: ARM Build
steps:
- name: Check out code
uses: actions/checkout@v6
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Set up QEMU and Buildx
id: setup
uses: ./.github/actions/setup
with:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
- name: Build and push arm64 standard build
uses: docker/build-push-action@v7
with:
context: .
file: docker/main/Dockerfile
push: true
platforms: linux/arm64
target: frigate
tags: |
${{ steps.setup.outputs.image-name }}-standard-arm64
cache-from: type=registry,ref=${{ steps.setup.outputs.cache-name }}-arm64
- name: Build and push RPi build
uses: docker/bake-action@v7
with:
source: .
push: true
targets: rpi
files: docker/rpi/rpi.hcl
set: |
rpi.tags=${{ steps.setup.outputs.image-name }}-rpi
*.cache-from=type=registry,ref=${{ steps.setup.outputs.cache-name }}-arm64
*.cache-to=type=registry,ref=${{ steps.setup.outputs.cache-name }}-arm64,mode=max
jetson_jp6_build:
runs-on: ubuntu-22.04-arm
name: Jetson Jetpack 6
steps:
- name: Check out code
uses: actions/checkout@v6
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Set up QEMU and Buildx
id: setup
uses: ./.github/actions/setup
with:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
- name: Build and push TensorRT (Jetson, Jetpack 6)
env:
ARCH: arm64
BASE_IMAGE: nvcr.io/nvidia/tensorrt:23.12-py3-igpu
SLIM_BASE: nvcr.io/nvidia/tensorrt:23.12-py3-igpu
TRT_BASE: nvcr.io/nvidia/tensorrt:23.12-py3-igpu
uses: docker/bake-action@v7
with:
source: .
push: true
targets: tensorrt
files: docker/tensorrt/trt.hcl
set: |
tensorrt.tags=${{ steps.setup.outputs.image-name }}-tensorrt-jp6
*.cache-from=type=registry,ref=${{ steps.setup.outputs.cache-name }}-jp6
*.cache-to=type=registry,ref=${{ steps.setup.outputs.cache-name }}-jp6,mode=max
amd64_extra_builds:
runs-on: ubuntu-22.04
name: AMD64 Extra Build
needs:
- amd64_build
steps:
- name: Check out code
uses: actions/checkout@v6
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Set up QEMU and Buildx
id: setup
uses: ./.github/actions/setup
with:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
- name: Build and push TensorRT (x86 GPU)
env:
COMPUTE_LEVEL: "50 60 70 80 90"
uses: docker/bake-action@v7
with:
source: .
push: true
targets: tensorrt
files: docker/tensorrt/trt.hcl
set: |
tensorrt.tags=${{ steps.setup.outputs.image-name }}-tensorrt
*.cache-from=type=registry,ref=${{ steps.setup.outputs.cache-name }}-tensorrt
*.cache-to=type=registry,ref=${{ steps.setup.outputs.cache-name }}-tensorrt,mode=max
- name: AMD/ROCm general build
env:
HSA_OVERRIDE: 0
uses: docker/bake-action@v7
with:
source: .
push: true
targets: rocm
files: docker/rocm/rocm.hcl
set: |
rocm.tags=${{ steps.setup.outputs.image-name }}-rocm
*.cache-to=type=registry,ref=${{ steps.setup.outputs.cache-name }}-rocm,mode=max
*.cache-from=type=registry,ref=${{ steps.setup.outputs.cache-name }}-rocm
arm64_extra_builds:
runs-on: ubuntu-22.04-arm
name: ARM Extra Build
needs:
- arm64_build
steps:
- name: Check out code
uses: actions/checkout@v6
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Set up QEMU and Buildx
id: setup
uses: ./.github/actions/setup
with:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
- name: Build and push Rockchip build
uses: docker/bake-action@v7
with:
source: .
push: true
targets: rk
files: docker/rockchip/rk.hcl
set: |
rk.tags=${{ steps.setup.outputs.image-name }}-rk
*.cache-from=type=gha
synaptics_build:
runs-on: ubuntu-22.04-arm
name: Synaptics Build
needs:
- arm64_build
steps:
- name: Check out code
uses: actions/checkout@v6
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Set up QEMU and Buildx
id: setup
uses: ./.github/actions/setup
with:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
- name: Build and push Synaptics build
uses: docker/bake-action@v7
with:
source: .
push: true
targets: synaptics
files: docker/synaptics/synaptics.hcl
set: |
synaptics.tags=${{ steps.setup.outputs.image-name }}-synaptics
*.cache-from=type=gha
# The majority of users running arm64 are rpi users, so the rpi
# build should be the primary arm64 image
assemble_default_build:
runs-on: ubuntu-22.04
name: Assemble and push default build
needs:
- amd64_build
- arm64_build
steps:
- id: lowercaseRepo
uses: ASzc/change-string-case-action@v6
with:
string: ${{ github.repository }}
- name: Log in to the Container registry
uses: docker/login-action@184bdaa0721073962dff0199f1fb9940f07167d1
with:
registry: ghcr.io
username: ${{ github.actor }}
password: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
- name: Create short sha
run: echo "SHORT_SHA=${GITHUB_SHA::7}" >> $GITHUB_ENV
- uses: int128/docker-manifest-create-action@v2
with:
tags: ghcr.io/${{ steps.lowercaseRepo.outputs.lowercase }}:${{ env.SHORT_SHA }}
sources: |
ghcr.io/${{ steps.lowercaseRepo.outputs.lowercase }}:${{ env.SHORT_SHA }}-amd64
ghcr.io/${{ steps.lowercaseRepo.outputs.lowercase }}:${{ env.SHORT_SHA }}-rpi