mirror of
https://github.com/blakeblackshear/frigate.git
synced 2026-09-28 10:56:52 +03:00
Josh HawkinsandNicolas Mowen
3be59c9c18
* Run the frigate service as the frigate user * Run go2rtc as its own restricted user * Run nginx as the frigate user with writable state in /tmp/nginx * Disable bandwidth stats gracefully when not running as root * Hand TensorRT model cache ownership to the runtime user * Document non-root operation and per-hardware device access * Create /media/frigate after the ownership sweep * Assert non-root services, JWT migration, and escape hatch in CI * only write the sweep sentinel when a media volume is mounted * tolerate homekit config chown failures in the go2rtc run script * chown the s6 log pipe so non-root nginx can reopen /dev/stdout * set HOME to /config for non-root services * run smoke nginx -t and the write probe as the runtime user * re-own the nginx shm cache on service restart * discard stdout for the unprivileged smoke nginx -t * unwrap hard-wrapped prose in the installation docs * report progress during the ownership sweep * document EXTRA_GROUPS as the only device access path for dropped services * expand the non-root device access docs with diagnosis steps and udev rules * document network storage ownership and the remaining detector hardware * skip lost+found during the ownership sweep * hand /tmp/cache to the runtime user before services start * make bundled models readable by the runtime user * reload nginx by signaling the master instead of parsing its config as root * harden root writes into unprivileged-owned paths Restrict the sweep sentinel to a mount at or below /media/frigate so a parent /media mount cannot bless a later-shadowed volume. Rebuild /tmp/nginx root-owned each start so root's cp and tempio writes cannot follow a symlink an unprivileged nginx planted in the previous run. * collapse the duplicated sentinel comment * add a service-runs-as-root helper for granular root services * validate FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES and fail fast on unknown names * let services listed in FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES skip the privilege drop * record the root-services mode in the sentinel and sweep small trees each boot * cache the runtime ids in the ownership helper * chown recordings, previews, and exports to the runtime user at create * chown the database files after init * recommend FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES in the bandwidth stats warning * assert granular root services in CI * document FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES * own every directory level created for a recording segment * clear the cached runtime ids when ownership tests finish * skip missing media paths in the per-boot ownership sweep * clarify granular root services docs * clean up * install acl for device access grants * grant runtime users access to mapped device nodes at boot * assert device access grants in CI * document automatic device access grants * stop telling users device access needs host side setup * clarify the non-root docs * link the migration script to the repo * group the manual device setup under one section * harden against symlink attacks /config is owned by the unprivileged runtime user after the ownership sweep, so root operations on files there could be redirected by a planted symlink. - go2rtc HomeKit setup: replace the root yq/jq normalization and chown with an O_NOFOLLOW helper (prepare_homekit.py), so a symlink at go2rtc_homekit.yml can't redirect a root write or chown onto another file - go2rtc binary override: ignore /config/go2rtc whenever the service runs as root, so a planted binary can't exec as root under FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES - sweep sentinel: read and write it through safe-sentinel, which trusts only a root-owned regular file and never follows a symlink, so it can't be forged to skip the migration or symlinked to clobber a root file - ownership sweep: chown with -execdir so a parent directory swapped for a symlink mid-walk can't redirect the chown out of the volume - validate inputs: restrict DEVICE_ACL_PATHS to /dev, require nonzero numeric EXTRA_GROUPS, and reject PUID/PGID that collide with the go2rtc ids - docs: correct the TLS key ownership note to match what actually happens * tweak docs * stop the ownership sweep chasing entries other mechanisms own * keep custom binaries out of root services only under granular root
78 lines
2.0 KiB
Plaintext
Executable File
78 lines
2.0 KiB
Plaintext
Executable File
#!/command/with-contenv bash
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# shellcheck shell=bash
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# Start the CERTSYNC service
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set -o errexit -o nounset -o pipefail
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# Logs should be sent to stdout so that s6 can collect them
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# Not `nginx -s reload`: that has root parse /tmp/nginx/conf, which the
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# unprivileged nginx user can rewrite, and nginx chowns path directives on load.
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function reload_nginx() {
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local pid
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if ! pid=$(cat /tmp/nginx/nginx.pid 2>/dev/null); then
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echo "[ERROR] No nginx pid file found, not reloading"
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return 0
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fi
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if [[ ! "$pid" =~ ^[0-9]+$ ]] || [[ "$(cat "/proc/${pid}/comm" 2>/dev/null)" != "nginx" ]]; then
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echo "[ERROR] nginx pid file does not name a running nginx process, not reloading"
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return 0
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fi
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kill -HUP "$pid"
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}
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echo "[INFO] Starting certsync..."
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lefile="/etc/letsencrypt/live/frigate/fullchain.pem"
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tls_enabled=`python3 /usr/local/nginx/get_nginx_settings.py | jq -r .tls.enabled`
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listen_external_port=`python3 /usr/local/nginx/get_nginx_settings.py | jq -r .listen.external_port`
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while true
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do
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if [[ "$tls_enabled" == 'false' ]]; then
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sleep 9999
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continue
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fi
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if [ ! -e $lefile ]
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then
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echo "[ERROR] TLS certificate does not exist: $lefile"
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fi
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leprint=`openssl x509 -in $lefile -fingerprint -noout 2>&1 || echo 'failed'`
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case "$leprint" in
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*Fingerprint*)
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;;
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*)
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echo "[ERROR] Missing fingerprint from $lefile"
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;;
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esac
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liveprint=`echo | openssl s_client -showcerts -connect 127.0.0.1:$listen_external_port 2>&1 | openssl x509 -fingerprint 2>&1 | grep -i fingerprint || echo 'failed'`
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case "$liveprint" in
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*Fingerprint*)
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;;
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*)
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echo "[ERROR] Missing fingerprint from current nginx TLS cert"
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;;
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esac
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if [[ "$leprint" != "failed" && "$liveprint" != "failed" && "$leprint" != "$liveprint" ]]
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then
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echo "[INFO] Reloading nginx to refresh TLS certificate"
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echo "$lefile: $leprint"
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reload_nginx
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fi
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sleep 60
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done
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exit 0
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