mirror of
https://github.com/blakeblackshear/frigate.git
synced 2026-09-26 01:18:59 +03:00
Josh HawkinsandNicolas Mowen
3be59c9c18
* Run the frigate service as the frigate user * Run go2rtc as its own restricted user * Run nginx as the frigate user with writable state in /tmp/nginx * Disable bandwidth stats gracefully when not running as root * Hand TensorRT model cache ownership to the runtime user * Document non-root operation and per-hardware device access * Create /media/frigate after the ownership sweep * Assert non-root services, JWT migration, and escape hatch in CI * only write the sweep sentinel when a media volume is mounted * tolerate homekit config chown failures in the go2rtc run script * chown the s6 log pipe so non-root nginx can reopen /dev/stdout * set HOME to /config for non-root services * run smoke nginx -t and the write probe as the runtime user * re-own the nginx shm cache on service restart * discard stdout for the unprivileged smoke nginx -t * unwrap hard-wrapped prose in the installation docs * report progress during the ownership sweep * document EXTRA_GROUPS as the only device access path for dropped services * expand the non-root device access docs with diagnosis steps and udev rules * document network storage ownership and the remaining detector hardware * skip lost+found during the ownership sweep * hand /tmp/cache to the runtime user before services start * make bundled models readable by the runtime user * reload nginx by signaling the master instead of parsing its config as root * harden root writes into unprivileged-owned paths Restrict the sweep sentinel to a mount at or below /media/frigate so a parent /media mount cannot bless a later-shadowed volume. Rebuild /tmp/nginx root-owned each start so root's cp and tempio writes cannot follow a symlink an unprivileged nginx planted in the previous run. * collapse the duplicated sentinel comment * add a service-runs-as-root helper for granular root services * validate FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES and fail fast on unknown names * let services listed in FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES skip the privilege drop * record the root-services mode in the sentinel and sweep small trees each boot * cache the runtime ids in the ownership helper * chown recordings, previews, and exports to the runtime user at create * chown the database files after init * recommend FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES in the bandwidth stats warning * assert granular root services in CI * document FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES * own every directory level created for a recording segment * clear the cached runtime ids when ownership tests finish * skip missing media paths in the per-boot ownership sweep * clarify granular root services docs * clean up * install acl for device access grants * grant runtime users access to mapped device nodes at boot * assert device access grants in CI * document automatic device access grants * stop telling users device access needs host side setup * clarify the non-root docs * link the migration script to the repo * group the manual device setup under one section * harden against symlink attacks /config is owned by the unprivileged runtime user after the ownership sweep, so root operations on files there could be redirected by a planted symlink. - go2rtc HomeKit setup: replace the root yq/jq normalization and chown with an O_NOFOLLOW helper (prepare_homekit.py), so a symlink at go2rtc_homekit.yml can't redirect a root write or chown onto another file - go2rtc binary override: ignore /config/go2rtc whenever the service runs as root, so a planted binary can't exec as root under FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES - sweep sentinel: read and write it through safe-sentinel, which trusts only a root-owned regular file and never follows a symlink, so it can't be forged to skip the migration or symlinked to clobber a root file - ownership sweep: chown with -execdir so a parent directory swapped for a symlink mid-walk can't redirect the chown out of the volume - validate inputs: restrict DEVICE_ACL_PATHS to /dev, require nonzero numeric EXTRA_GROUPS, and reject PUID/PGID that collide with the go2rtc ids - docs: correct the TLS key ownership note to match what actually happens * tweak docs * stop the ownership sweep chasing entries other mechanisms own * keep custom binaries out of root services only under granular root
75 lines
2.1 KiB
Python
Executable File
75 lines
2.1 KiB
Python
Executable File
#!/usr/bin/env python3
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"""Read or write the ownership sweep sentinel without following symlinks.
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The sentinel lives in /config, which the unprivileged runtime user owns, so it
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can be swapped for a symlink. read trusts only a root-owned regular file; write
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never follows a symlink or fifo onto another file.
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Usage:
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safe-sentinel read PATH print content, exit 0 only if root-owned regular file
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safe-sentinel write PATH CONTENT write CONTENT to a regular file at PATH
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"""
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import errno
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import os
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import stat
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import sys
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MODE = 0o644
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def do_read(path: str) -> int:
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try:
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fd = os.open(path, os.O_RDONLY | os.O_NOFOLLOW)
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except OSError:
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return 1
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try:
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st = os.fstat(fd)
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if not stat.S_ISREG(st.st_mode) or st.st_uid != 0:
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return 1
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sys.stdout.buffer.write(os.read(fd, 4096))
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finally:
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os.close(fd)
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return 0
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def do_write(path: str, content: str) -> int:
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# O_NONBLOCK so a fifo fails fast (ENXIO) instead of blocking the open.
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flags = os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_NOFOLLOW | os.O_NONBLOCK
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replace = (errno.ELOOP, errno.ENXIO)
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try:
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fd = os.open(path, flags, MODE)
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if not stat.S_ISREG(os.fstat(fd).st_mode):
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os.close(fd)
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raise OSError(errno.ELOOP, "not a regular file")
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except OSError as err:
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if err.errno not in replace:
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raise
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os.unlink(path)
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fd = os.open(path, flags | os.O_EXCL, MODE)
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try:
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os.ftruncate(fd, 0)
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os.write(fd, content.encode())
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# keep it root-owned so a later sweep that chowned the old sentinel to
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# the runtime user can't make the next read reject and re-sweep
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os.fchown(fd, 0, 0)
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finally:
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os.close(fd)
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return 0
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def main(argv: list[str]) -> int:
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if len(argv) == 3 and argv[1] == "read":
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return do_read(argv[2])
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if len(argv) == 4 and argv[1] == "write":
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try:
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return do_write(argv[2], argv[3])
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except OSError:
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return 1
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print("usage: safe-sentinel read PATH | write PATH CONTENT", file=sys.stderr)
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return 2
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if __name__ == "__main__":
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sys.exit(main(sys.argv))
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