Files
frigate/docker/main/rootfs/etc/s6-overlay/s6-rc.d/go2rtc/run
T
Josh HawkinsandNicolas Mowen 3be59c9c18 Container security hardening (phase 3, breaking) (#24081)
* Run the frigate service as the frigate user

* Run go2rtc as its own restricted user

* Run nginx as the frigate user with writable state in /tmp/nginx

* Disable bandwidth stats gracefully when not running as root

* Hand TensorRT model cache ownership to the runtime user

* Document non-root operation and per-hardware device access

* Create /media/frigate after the ownership sweep

* Assert non-root services, JWT migration, and escape hatch in CI

* only write the sweep sentinel when a media volume is mounted

* tolerate homekit config chown failures in the go2rtc run script

* chown the s6 log pipe so non-root nginx can reopen /dev/stdout

* set HOME to /config for non-root services

* run smoke nginx -t and the write probe as the runtime user

* re-own the nginx shm cache on service restart

* discard stdout for the unprivileged smoke nginx -t

* unwrap hard-wrapped prose in the installation docs

* report progress during the ownership sweep

* document EXTRA_GROUPS as the only device access path for dropped services

* expand the non-root device access docs with diagnosis steps and udev rules

* document network storage ownership and the remaining detector hardware

* skip lost+found during the ownership sweep

* hand /tmp/cache to the runtime user before services start

* make bundled models readable by the runtime user

* reload nginx by signaling the master instead of parsing its config as root

* harden root writes into unprivileged-owned paths

Restrict the sweep sentinel to a mount at or below /media/frigate so a
parent /media mount cannot bless a later-shadowed volume. Rebuild
/tmp/nginx root-owned each start so root's cp and tempio writes cannot
follow a symlink an unprivileged nginx planted in the previous run.

* collapse the duplicated sentinel comment

* add a service-runs-as-root helper for granular root services

* validate FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES and fail fast on unknown names

* let services listed in FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES skip the privilege drop

* record the root-services mode in the sentinel and sweep small trees each boot

* cache the runtime ids in the ownership helper

* chown recordings, previews, and exports to the runtime user at create

* chown the database files after init

* recommend FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES in the bandwidth stats warning

* assert granular root services in CI

* document FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES

* own every directory level created for a recording segment

* clear the cached runtime ids when ownership tests finish

* skip missing media paths in the per-boot ownership sweep

* clarify granular root services docs

* clean up

* install acl for device access grants

* grant runtime users access to mapped device nodes at boot

* assert device access grants in CI

* document automatic device access grants

* stop telling users device access needs host side setup

* clarify the non-root docs

* link the migration script to the repo

* group the manual device setup under one section

* harden against symlink attacks

/config is owned by the unprivileged runtime user after the ownership sweep, so root operations on files there could be redirected by a planted symlink.

- go2rtc HomeKit setup: replace the root yq/jq normalization and chown with an O_NOFOLLOW helper (prepare_homekit.py), so a symlink at go2rtc_homekit.yml can't redirect a root write or chown onto another file
- go2rtc binary override: ignore /config/go2rtc whenever the service runs as root, so a planted binary can't exec as root under FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES
- sweep sentinel: read and write it through safe-sentinel, which trusts only a root-owned regular file and never follows a symlink, so it can't be forged to skip the migration or symlinked to clobber a root file
- ownership sweep: chown with -execdir so a parent directory swapped for a symlink mid-walk can't redirect the chown out of the volume
- validate inputs: restrict DEVICE_ACL_PATHS to /dev, require nonzero numeric EXTRA_GROUPS, and reject PUID/PGID that collide with the go2rtc ids
- docs: correct the TLS key ownership note to match what actually happens

* tweak docs

* stop the ownership sweep chasing entries other mechanisms own

* keep custom binaries out of root services only under granular root
2026-09-12 07:30:04 -06:00

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#!/command/with-contenv bash
# shellcheck shell=bash
# Start the go2rtc service
set -o errexit -o nounset -o pipefail
runs_as_root=0
if [[ "$(id -u)" -eq 0 ]]; then
if [[ "${FRIGATE_RUN_AS_ROOT:-false}" == "true" ]] || /usr/local/bin/service-runs-as-root go2rtc; then
runs_as_root=1
fi
fi
# Root via FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES only; the escape hatch sweeps nothing and
# leaves no unprivileged service, so /config/go2rtc stays as safe as pre-drop.
granular_root=0
if [[ "$runs_as_root" -eq 1 && "${FRIGATE_RUN_AS_ROOT:-false}" != "true" ]]; then
granular_root=1
fi
# Logs should be sent to stdout so that s6 can collect them
function get_ip_and_port_from_supervisor() {
local ip_address
# Example: 192.168.1.10/24
local ip_regex='^([0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3})/[0-9]{1,2}$'
if ip_address=$(
curl -fsSL \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${SUPERVISOR_TOKEN}" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
http://supervisor/network/interface/default/info |
jq --exit-status --raw-output '.data.ipv4.address[0]'
) && [[ "${ip_address}" =~ ${ip_regex} ]]; then
ip_address="${BASH_REMATCH[1]}"
echo "[INFO] Got IP address from supervisor: ${ip_address}"
else
echo "[WARN] Failed to get IP address from supervisor"
return 0
fi
local webrtc_port
local port_regex='^([0-9]{1,5})$'
if webrtc_port=$(
curl -fsSL \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${SUPERVISOR_TOKEN}" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
http://supervisor/addons/self/info |
jq --exit-status --raw-output '.data.network["8555/tcp"]'
) && [[ "${webrtc_port}" =~ ${port_regex} ]]; then
webrtc_port="${BASH_REMATCH[1]}"
echo "[INFO] Got WebRTC port from supervisor: ${webrtc_port}"
else
echo "[WARN] Failed to get WebRTC port from supervisor"
return 0
fi
export FRIGATE_GO2RTC_WEBRTC_CANDIDATE_INTERNAL="${ip_address}:${webrtc_port}"
}
function set_libva_version() {
local ffmpeg_path
ffmpeg_path=$(python3 /usr/local/ffmpeg/get_ffmpeg_path.py)
LIBAVFORMAT_VERSION_MAJOR=$("$ffmpeg_path" -version | grep -Po "libavformat\W+\K\d+")
export LIBAVFORMAT_VERSION_MAJOR
}
set_libva_version
if [[ -f "/dev/shm/go2rtc.yaml" ]]; then
echo "[INFO] Removing stale config from last run..."
rm /dev/shm/go2rtc.yaml
fi
if [[ ! -f "/dev/shm/go2rtc.yaml" ]]; then
echo "[INFO] Preparing new go2rtc config..."
if [[ -n "${SUPERVISOR_TOKEN:-}" ]]; then
# Running as a Home Assistant Add-on, infer the IP address and port
get_ip_and_port_from_supervisor
fi
python3 /usr/local/go2rtc/create_config.py
else
echo "[WARNING] Unable to remove existing go2rtc config. Changes made to your frigate config file may not be recognized. Please remove the /dev/shm/go2rtc.yaml from your docker host manually."
fi
# HomeKit persistence. The helper is symlink-safe; hand off to go2rtc only when dropping.
readonly homekit_config_path="/config/go2rtc_homekit.yml"
if [[ "$(id -u)" -eq 0 && "$runs_as_root" -eq 0 ]]; then
python3 /usr/local/go2rtc/prepare_homekit.py "${homekit_config_path}" --chown
chown go2rtc:go2rtc /dev/shm/go2rtc.yaml 2>/dev/null || true
else
python3 /usr/local/go2rtc/prepare_homekit.py "${homekit_config_path}"
fi
readonly config_path="/config"
# the sweep hands /config to uid 1000, so a root service must not exec from it
if [[ "$granular_root" -eq 1 && -x "${config_path}/go2rtc" ]]; then
echo "[WARN] Ignoring '${config_path}/go2rtc' because FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES runs this service as root and /config is owned by the runtime user; using the embedded binary"
echo "[WARN] Use FRIGATE_RUN_AS_ROOT=true instead if you need both a custom go2rtc build and root"
readonly binary_path="/usr/local/go2rtc/bin/go2rtc"
elif [[ -x "${config_path}/go2rtc" ]]; then
readonly binary_path="${config_path}/go2rtc"
echo "[WARN] Using go2rtc binary from '${binary_path}' instead of the embedded one"
else
readonly binary_path="/usr/local/go2rtc/bin/go2rtc"
fi
echo "[INFO] Starting go2rtc..."
# Replace the bash process with the go2rtc process, redirecting stderr to stdout
# Use HomeKit config as the primary config so writebacks go there
# The main config from Frigate will be loaded as a secondary config
exec 2>&1
if [[ "$(id -u)" -ne 0 || "$runs_as_root" -eq 1 ]]; then
exec "${binary_path}" -config="${homekit_config_path}" -config=/dev/shm/go2rtc.yaml
else
exec s6-setuidgid go2rtc "${binary_path}" -config="${homekit_config_path}" -config=/dev/shm/go2rtc.yaml
fi