Files
frigate/docker/main/rootfs/usr/local/nginx/conf/nginx.conf
T
Josh HawkinsandNicolas Mowen c004d0a1c9 Container security hardening (phase 1) (#24061)
* Verify s6-overlay downloads against pinned checksums

* Verify go2rtc download against pinned checksums

The v1.9.14 release publishes no checksums file, just the bare per-platform binaries, so these digests come from a one-time fetch rather than upstream. That pins the artifact against later substitution, which is the realistic threat for a version we stay on for months, but it does not verify the original download. The stage moves from `ADD --link` to a script because `ADD --checksum` can't express an architecture-dependent URL.

* Verify main image downloads against pinned checksums

Covers everything the main image downloads on the default path: tempio, the hailort runtime tarball and wheel, the six ffmpeg builds, the libedgetpu deb, and the thirteen Intel driver debs. The hailort tarball was streamed straight into `tar`, which can't be verified before extraction, so it downloads to `/tmp` first. The three ffmpeg blocks per arch collapse into one `install_ffmpeg` helper since they only differed by URL and install dir, and the Intel debs go through a `fetch_intel_deb` helper for the same reason.

The Intel debs are the ones that mattered most here. They're installed as root with `dpkg` on the default amd64 path and had no verification at all. compute-runtime publishes a `ww<week>.sum` asset with every release and npu-driver published `checksum.sha256` on v1.19.0, so those eight digests came from upstream rather than from us. intel-graphics-compiler and level-zero publish none, so those five and everything else here come from a one-time fetch, which pins the artifact against later substitution but doesn't verify the original download. The comment above the map says which is which and how to refresh them, since npu-driver has stopped publishing sums since v1.19.0 and that provenance won't survive the next bump.

Still unpinned: `get-pip.py`, which is a rolling URL where a digest would just break the build on pypa's next edit, and the per-variant artifacts for Axera, Synaptics, and Jetson. apt repositories are out of scope since apt already verifies signatures.

* Restrict generated TLS key permissions

OpenSSL 3.x already writes the key at 600 on its own, so this pins the guarantee rather than fixing an observed leak: the mode no longer depends on the openssl version or the umask the service happens to start with. Only the generated pair is touched. User-mounted certs take the other branch and are never chmod'd, which matters when they're mounted read-only.

* Add security headers and server_tokens off

Adds `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` and `Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin`, and turns off nginx version disclosure.

No `X-Frame-Options` and no CSP `frame-ancestors`. HA's Webpage card and iframe panels frame Frigate's own address cross-origin, and either header would break them silently with nothing in Frigate's logs to explain it. Ingress is same-origin and would survive `SAMEORIGIN`, but Frigate can't tell the two apart from inside the container. `security_headers.conf` is a plain file in the image rather than a generated one, so anyone who does want framing restrictions can bind-mount it.

`add_header` doesn't inherit into a block that declares its own, so the include goes in per block, all nine of them, including the four nested static-asset locations that serve the JS bundles. Those are the ones nosniff actually matters for.

The run script now reads `get_nginx_settings.py` once into a variable instead of shelling out per template. That script imports the frigate config machinery, which is noticeable on an SBC.

Not fixed here: `listen.conf` is included at server level and carries `Strict-Transport-Security`, so those same nine blocks already drop HSTS under TLS today. Folding it into this file would change existing TLS behavior on nine paths, so it needs its own PR.

* Restrict go2rtc config file permissions

* Log failed login attempts with source address

Failed logins returned a bare 401 and left nothing behind, so credential stuffing was invisible unless you were already watching nginx access logs. Both failure branches now log a warning with the attempted username and the client address.

The address comes from `get_remote_addr()`, the same helper the login rate limiter keys on, so the two agree on who the client is and the trusted-proxy handling is consistent. Logging a raw `x-forwarded-for` instead would let an attacker forge the source address in the very log line meant to catch them.

The response is unchanged and identical either way. Which factor failed is only visible in the log, never to the client, and the password is never logged.

* Recommend least-privilege container options in install docs

The compose generator pushed `privileged: true` into every file it produced, no matter what hardware you picked, and it's the default tab on the install page so it's what most people copy. It now emits `security_opt: no-new-privileges:true` instead, and only adds `privileged: true` for hardware that actually needs it, with the reason inline. MemryX is the only one today, since it needs to reach the max-manager. Rockchip and Synaptics only want privileged during initial setup and their documented end state is device mappings, so neither gets it.

`no-new-privileges` merges into the same `security_opt` block as any device-specific entries, so Rockchip still gets its `apparmor=unconfined` and `systempaths=unconfined` without a duplicate key.

The static example now has `privileged` commented out, and there's a short section on the options worth adding, with a note that `cap_drop: ALL` breaks `telemetry.stats.network_bandwidth` since nethogs needs NET_ADMIN/NET_RAW.

* Add amd64 container smoke test to CI

Boots the built amd64 image against a minimal config and asserts the two security headers, that the Server header no longer carries a version, that no frame-ancestors is present, that nginx accepts its own config, and the two file modes. This is also the harness the rest of the hardening work extends.

The two negative assertions are written as `if grep; then exit 1; fi` rather than `! grep`. Bash exempts a negated command from `set -e`, so the `!` form would have passed even with the version and frame-ancestors both present, which is the opposite of what a regression net is for.
2026-09-12 07:30:04 -06:00

383 lines
12 KiB
Nginx Configuration File

daemon off;
user root;
worker_processes auto;
error_log /dev/stdout warn;
pid /var/run/nginx.pid;
events {
worker_connections 1024;
}
http {
map_hash_bucket_size 256;
server_tokens off;
include mime.types;
default_type application/octet-stream;
log_format main '$remote_addr - $remote_user [$time_local] "$request" '
'$status $body_bytes_sent "$http_referer" '
'"$http_user_agent" "$http_x_forwarded_for" '
'request_time="$request_time" upstream_response_time="$upstream_response_time"';
access_log /dev/stdout main;
# send headers in one piece, it is better than sending them one by one
tcp_nopush on;
sendfile on;
keepalive_timeout 65;
gzip on;
gzip_comp_level 6;
gzip_types text/plain text/css application/json application/x-javascript application/javascript text/javascript image/svg+xml image/x-icon image/bmp;
gzip_proxied no-cache no-store private expired auth;
gzip_vary on;
proxy_cache_path /dev/shm/nginx_cache levels=1:2 keys_zone=api_cache:10m max_size=10m inactive=1m use_temp_path=off;
map $sent_http_content_type $should_not_cache {
'application/json' 0;
default 1;
}
upstream frigate_api {
server 127.0.0.1:5001;
keepalive 1024;
}
upstream mqtt_ws {
server 127.0.0.1:5002;
keepalive 1024;
}
upstream jsmpeg {
server 127.0.0.1:8082;
keepalive 1024;
}
include go2rtc_upstream.conf;
server {
include listen.conf;
include security_headers.conf;
# enable HTTP/2 for TLS connections to eliminate browser 6-connection limit
http2 on;
# vod settings
vod_base_url '';
vod_segments_base_url '';
vod_mode mapped;
vod_max_mapping_response_size 1m;
vod_upstream_location /api;
vod_align_segments_to_key_frames on;
vod_manifest_segment_durations_mode accurate;
vod_ignore_edit_list on;
# short leading segments at each playlist start; sources start at
# the seek target, so the ladder applies to every seek. Only
# effective when clips declare real keyFrameDurations
vod_bootstrap_segment_durations 1000;
vod_bootstrap_segment_durations 2000;
vod_bootstrap_segment_durations 4000;
vod_segment_duration 10000;
# MPEG-TS settings (not used when fMP4 is enabled, kept for reference)
vod_hls_mpegts_align_frames off;
vod_hls_mpegts_interleave_frames on;
# file handle caching / aio
open_file_cache max=1000 inactive=5m;
open_file_cache_valid 2m;
open_file_cache_min_uses 1;
open_file_cache_errors on;
aio on;
# file upload size
client_max_body_size 20M;
# https://github.com/kaltura/nginx-vod-module#vod_open_file_thread_pool
vod_open_file_thread_pool default;
# vod caches
vod_metadata_cache metadata_cache 512m;
vod_mapping_cache mapping_cache 5m 10m;
# gzip manifests
gzip on;
gzip_types application/vnd.apple.mpegurl;
include auth_location.conf;
include base_path.conf;
location /vod/ {
include auth_request.conf;
aio threads;
vod hls;
# Use fMP4 (fragmented MP4) instead of MPEG-TS for better performance
# Smaller segments, faster generation, better browser compatibility
vod_hls_container_format fmp4;
secure_token $args;
secure_token_types application/vnd.apple.mpegurl;
include security_headers.conf;
add_header Cache-Control "no-store";
expires off;
keepalive_disable safari;
# vod module returns 502 for non-existent media
# https://github.com/kaltura/nginx-vod-module/issues/468
error_page 502 =404 /vod-not-found;
}
location = /vod-not-found {
return 404;
}
location /stream/ {
include auth_request.conf;
include security_headers.conf;
add_header Cache-Control "no-store";
expires off;
types {
application/dash+xml mpd;
application/vnd.apple.mpegurl m3u8;
video/mp2t ts;
image/jpeg jpg;
}
root /tmp;
}
location /clips/ {
include auth_request.conf;
types {
video/mp4 mp4;
image/jpeg jpg jpeg;
image/png png;
image/webp webp;
}
expires 7d;
include security_headers.conf;
add_header Cache-Control "public";
autoindex on;
root /media/frigate;
}
location /cache/ {
internal; # This tells nginx it's not accessible from the outside
alias /tmp/cache/;
}
location /recordings/ {
include auth_request.conf;
types {
video/mp4 mp4;
}
autoindex on;
autoindex_format json;
root /media/frigate;
}
location /exports/ {
include auth_request.conf;
types {
video/mp4 mp4;
}
autoindex on;
autoindex_format json;
root /media/frigate;
}
location /ws {
include auth_request.conf;
proxy_pass http://mqtt_ws/;
include proxy.conf;
}
location /live/jsmpeg/ {
include auth_request.conf;
proxy_pass http://jsmpeg/;
include proxy.conf;
}
# frigate lovelace card uses this path
location /live/mse/api/ws {
include auth_request.conf;
limit_except GET {
deny all;
}
proxy_pass http://go2rtc/api/ws;
include proxy.conf;
}
location /live/webrtc/api/ws {
include auth_request.conf;
limit_except GET {
deny all;
}
proxy_pass http://go2rtc/api/ws;
include proxy.conf;
}
# pass through go2rtc player
location /live/webrtc/webrtc.html {
include auth_request.conf;
limit_except GET {
deny all;
}
proxy_pass http://go2rtc/webrtc.html;
include proxy.conf;
}
# integration uses this to add webrtc candidate
location /api/go2rtc/webrtc {
include auth_request.conf;
limit_except POST {
deny all;
}
proxy_pass http://go2rtc/api/webrtc;
include proxy.conf;
}
location ~* /api/.*\.(jpg|jpeg|png|webp|gif)$ {
include auth_request.conf;
rewrite ^/api/(.*)$ /$1 break;
proxy_pass http://frigate_api;
include proxy.conf;
}
location /api/ {
include auth_request.conf;
include security_headers.conf;
add_header Cache-Control "no-store";
expires off;
proxy_pass http://frigate_api/;
include proxy.conf;
proxy_cache api_cache;
proxy_cache_key "$scheme$proxy_host$request_uri|$role|$groups|$user";
proxy_cache_lock on;
proxy_cache_use_stale updating;
proxy_cache_valid 200 5s;
proxy_cache_bypass $http_x_cache_bypass;
proxy_no_cache $should_not_cache;
add_header X-Cache-Status $upstream_cache_status;
location /api/vod/ {
include auth_request.conf;
proxy_pass http://frigate_api/vod/;
include proxy.conf;
proxy_cache off;
}
location /api/login {
auth_request off;
rewrite ^/api(/.*)$ $1 break;
proxy_pass http://frigate_api;
include proxy.conf;
}
location /api/logout {
auth_request off;
rewrite ^/api(/.*)$ $1 break;
proxy_pass http://frigate_api;
include proxy.conf;
}
# Allow unauthenticated access to the first_time_login endpoint
# so the login page can load help text before authentication.
location /api/auth/first_time_login {
auth_request off;
limit_except GET {
deny all;
}
rewrite ^/api(/.*)$ $1 break;
proxy_pass http://frigate_api;
include proxy.conf;
}
location /api/stats {
include auth_request.conf;
access_log off;
rewrite ^/api(/.*)$ $1 break;
proxy_pass http://frigate_api;
include proxy.conf;
}
location /api/version {
include auth_request.conf;
access_log off;
rewrite ^/api(/.*)$ $1 break;
proxy_pass http://frigate_api;
include proxy.conf;
}
}
location / {
# do not require auth for static assets
include security_headers.conf;
add_header Cache-Control "no-store";
expires off;
location /assets/ {
access_log off;
expires 1y;
include security_headers.conf;
add_header Cache-Control "public";
}
location /fonts/ {
access_log off;
expires 1y;
include security_headers.conf;
add_header Cache-Control "public";
}
location /locales/ {
access_log off;
include security_headers.conf;
add_header Cache-Control "public";
}
location ~ ^/.*-([A-Za-z0-9]+)\.webmanifest$ {
access_log off;
expires 1y;
include security_headers.conf;
add_header Cache-Control "public";
default_type application/json;
proxy_set_header Accept-Encoding "";
sub_filter_once off;
sub_filter_types application/json;
sub_filter '"start_url": "/BASE_PATH/"' '"start_url" : "$http_x_ingress_path/"';
sub_filter '"src": "/BASE_PATH/' '"src": "$http_x_ingress_path/';
}
sub_filter 'href="/BASE_PATH/' 'href="$http_x_ingress_path/';
sub_filter 'url(/BASE_PATH/' 'url($http_x_ingress_path/';
sub_filter '"/BASE_PATH/dist/' '"$http_x_ingress_path/dist/';
sub_filter '"/BASE_PATH/js/' '"$http_x_ingress_path/js/';
sub_filter '"/BASE_PATH/assets/' '"$http_x_ingress_path/assets/';
sub_filter '"/BASE_PATH/locales/' '"$http_x_ingress_path/locales/';
sub_filter '"/BASE_PATH/monacoeditorwork/' '"$http_x_ingress_path/assets/';
sub_filter 'return"/BASE_PATH/"' 'return window.baseUrl';
sub_filter '<body>' '<body><script>window.baseUrl="$http_x_ingress_path/";</script>';
sub_filter_types text/css application/javascript;
sub_filter_once off;
root /opt/frigate/web;
try_files $uri $uri.html $uri/ /index.html;
}
}
}