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sanitize_filename leaves ".." intact and collapses variants like "..:" and "..*" to "..", so filesystem paths built from face names, classification model/category names, image ids, and trigger data could escape their base directory. Route every such site through new frigate/util/path.py helpers (safe_join, sanitize_path_component, sanitize_contained_path), which reject traversal and verify containment.
Worst case was DELETE /classification/{name}, which rmtree'd /media/frigate and /config while returning 200.
Important to note that all affected endpoints already require admin permission, so this sould be considered hardening rather than fixing exploitable code.