Commit Graph
5 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Josh HawkinsandNicolas Mowen 41bc1a5844 Container security hardening (phase 4) (#24140)
* Support read-only rootfs with self-signed certs in /config/tls

* Support read-only rootfs in s6 and pre-compile bytecode

* Assert read-only rootfs support in CI

* Document hardened read-only deployment

* keep certsync's cert selection identical to nginx's

* note the uid trade-off in user: mode

* fail fast when EXTRA_GROUPS or a missing media volume meets read_only

* keep nosuid and nodev on the /run tmpfs

* support read_only in the default mode

* don't take go2rtc down when the homekit file isn't writable

* lead with the hardware consequence of switching to user:

* refuse to write TLS material through a symlink as root

* note that memryx writes models to the root filesystem

* certsync watches whichever cert path nginx loaded
2026-09-12 07:30:04 -06:00
Josh HawkinsandNicolas Mowen 3be59c9c18 Container security hardening (phase 3, breaking) (#24081)
* Run the frigate service as the frigate user

* Run go2rtc as its own restricted user

* Run nginx as the frigate user with writable state in /tmp/nginx

* Disable bandwidth stats gracefully when not running as root

* Hand TensorRT model cache ownership to the runtime user

* Document non-root operation and per-hardware device access

* Create /media/frigate after the ownership sweep

* Assert non-root services, JWT migration, and escape hatch in CI

* only write the sweep sentinel when a media volume is mounted

* tolerate homekit config chown failures in the go2rtc run script

* chown the s6 log pipe so non-root nginx can reopen /dev/stdout

* set HOME to /config for non-root services

* run smoke nginx -t and the write probe as the runtime user

* re-own the nginx shm cache on service restart

* discard stdout for the unprivileged smoke nginx -t

* unwrap hard-wrapped prose in the installation docs

* report progress during the ownership sweep

* document EXTRA_GROUPS as the only device access path for dropped services

* expand the non-root device access docs with diagnosis steps and udev rules

* document network storage ownership and the remaining detector hardware

* skip lost+found during the ownership sweep

* hand /tmp/cache to the runtime user before services start

* make bundled models readable by the runtime user

* reload nginx by signaling the master instead of parsing its config as root

* harden root writes into unprivileged-owned paths

Restrict the sweep sentinel to a mount at or below /media/frigate so a
parent /media mount cannot bless a later-shadowed volume. Rebuild
/tmp/nginx root-owned each start so root's cp and tempio writes cannot
follow a symlink an unprivileged nginx planted in the previous run.

* collapse the duplicated sentinel comment

* add a service-runs-as-root helper for granular root services

* validate FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES and fail fast on unknown names

* let services listed in FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES skip the privilege drop

* record the root-services mode in the sentinel and sweep small trees each boot

* cache the runtime ids in the ownership helper

* chown recordings, previews, and exports to the runtime user at create

* chown the database files after init

* recommend FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES in the bandwidth stats warning

* assert granular root services in CI

* document FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES

* own every directory level created for a recording segment

* clear the cached runtime ids when ownership tests finish

* skip missing media paths in the per-boot ownership sweep

* clarify granular root services docs

* clean up

* install acl for device access grants

* grant runtime users access to mapped device nodes at boot

* assert device access grants in CI

* document automatic device access grants

* stop telling users device access needs host side setup

* clarify the non-root docs

* link the migration script to the repo

* group the manual device setup under one section

* harden against symlink attacks

/config is owned by the unprivileged runtime user after the ownership sweep, so root operations on files there could be redirected by a planted symlink.

- go2rtc HomeKit setup: replace the root yq/jq normalization and chown with an O_NOFOLLOW helper (prepare_homekit.py), so a symlink at go2rtc_homekit.yml can't redirect a root write or chown onto another file
- go2rtc binary override: ignore /config/go2rtc whenever the service runs as root, so a planted binary can't exec as root under FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES
- sweep sentinel: read and write it through safe-sentinel, which trusts only a root-owned regular file and never follows a symlink, so it can't be forged to skip the migration or symlinked to clobber a root file
- ownership sweep: chown with -execdir so a parent directory swapped for a symlink mid-walk can't redirect the chown out of the volume
- validate inputs: restrict DEVICE_ACL_PATHS to /dev, require nonzero numeric EXTRA_GROUPS, and reject PUID/PGID that collide with the go2rtc ids
- docs: correct the TLS key ownership note to match what actually happens

* tweak docs

* stop the ownership sweep chasing entries other mechanisms own

* keep custom binaries out of root services only under granular root
2026-09-12 07:30:04 -06:00
Josh HawkinsandNicolas Mowen 40793b8478 Container security hardening (phase 2) (#24068)
* Create frigate and go2rtc runtime users in the image

* Add single fix-ownership helper for volume permission migration

* Add init-usermod oneshot for PUID and PGID remapping

* Chown newly created runtime directories to the frigate user

* Run sentinel-guarded ownership sweep during prepare

* Add host-side volume permission migration script

* Guard log directory ownership for user-mode startup

* Fall back to plain s6-log when running without root

* Assert PUID remapping and sweep sentinel in CI smoke test

* Skip the ownership sweep in the devcontainer

* Pin FRIGATE_RUN_AS_ROOT in ownership tests

* Do not record the sweep as complete when a chown failed

* Validate PUID and PGID in the migration script

* Treat a failed ownership scan as an incomplete sweep

* Reject PUID and PGID of 0 during remapping

* Handle symlinks, dry runs, and sentinel write failures in the sweep

* Treat an absent sweep root as an incomplete sweep
2026-09-12 07:30:04 -06:00
Felipe SantosandGitHub 52d94231c7 Avoid unhealthy container when Frigate is stopping (#18021) 2025-05-07 19:43:51 -05:00
f8b0329b37 Move database and config from homeassistant /config to addon /config (#16337)
* Move database and config from homeassistant /config to addon /config

* Re-implement config migration for the add-on

* Align some terms

* Improve function name

* Use local variables

* Add model.path migration

* Fix homeassistant config path

* Ensure migration scripts run before go2rtc and frigate

* Migrate all files I know

* Add ffmpeg.path migration

* Update docker/main/rootfs/etc/s6-overlay/s6-rc.d/prepare/run

Co-authored-by: Josh Hawkins <32435876+hawkeye217@users.noreply.github.com>

* Improve some variable names and organization

* Update docs to reflect addon config dir

* Update live.md with /addon_configs

* Move addon config section to configuration doc

* Align several terminologies and improve text

* Fix webrtc example config title

* Capitalize Add-on in more places

* Improve specific add-on config dir docs

* Align bash and python scripts to prefer config.yml over config.yaml

* Support config.json in migration shell scripts

* Change docs to reflect config.yml is preferred over config.yaml

* If previous config was yaml, migrate to yaml

* Fix typo in edgetpu.md

* Fix formatting of Python files

* Remove HailoRT Beta add-on variant from docs

* Add migration for labelmap and certs

* Fix variable name

* Fix new_config_file var unset

* Fix addon config directories table

* Improve db migration to avoid migrating files like .db.bak

* Fix echo location

---------

Co-authored-by: Josh Hawkins <32435876+hawkeye217@users.noreply.github.com>
2025-03-24 09:05:59 -05:00