Commit Graph
7 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Josh Hawkins 46c189fced harden against symlink attacks
/config is owned by the unprivileged runtime user after the ownership sweep, so root operations on files there could be redirected by a planted symlink.

- go2rtc HomeKit setup: replace the root yq/jq normalization and chown with an O_NOFOLLOW helper (prepare_homekit.py), so a symlink at go2rtc_homekit.yml can't redirect a root write or chown onto another file
- go2rtc binary override: ignore /config/go2rtc whenever the service runs as root, so a planted binary can't exec as root under FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES
- sweep sentinel: read and write it through safe-sentinel, which trusts only a root-owned regular file and never follows a symlink, so it can't be forged to skip the migration or symlinked to clobber a root file
- ownership sweep: chown with -execdir so a parent directory swapped for a symlink mid-walk can't redirect the chown out of the volume
- validate inputs: restrict DEVICE_ACL_PATHS to /dev, require nonzero numeric EXTRA_GROUPS, and reject PUID/PGID that collide with the go2rtc ids
- docs: correct the TLS key ownership note to match what actually happens
2026-08-29 17:26:17 -05:00
Josh Hawkins b9ce2988d8 clean up 2026-08-29 15:59:23 -05:00
Josh Hawkins 903c59ff8c record the root-services mode in the sentinel and sweep small trees each boot 2026-08-29 15:59:23 -05:00
Josh Hawkins 9e356f1d3f skip lost+found during the ownership sweep 2026-08-29 15:59:23 -05:00
Josh Hawkins 7f175e1a17 report progress during the ownership sweep 2026-08-29 15:59:23 -05:00
Josh Hawkins 9ce146fd99 Run the frigate service as the frigate user 2026-08-29 15:59:23 -05:00
Josh Hawkins 9d109bfd12 Container security hardening (phase 2) (#24068)
* Create frigate and go2rtc runtime users in the image

* Add single fix-ownership helper for volume permission migration

* Add init-usermod oneshot for PUID and PGID remapping

* Chown newly created runtime directories to the frigate user

* Run sentinel-guarded ownership sweep during prepare

* Add host-side volume permission migration script

* Guard log directory ownership for user-mode startup

* Fall back to plain s6-log when running without root

* Assert PUID remapping and sweep sentinel in CI smoke test

* Skip the ownership sweep in the devcontainer

* Pin FRIGATE_RUN_AS_ROOT in ownership tests

* Do not record the sweep as complete when a chown failed

* Validate PUID and PGID in the migration script

* Treat a failed ownership scan as an incomplete sweep

* Reject PUID and PGID of 0 during remapping

* Handle symlinks, dry runs, and sentinel write failures in the sweep

* Treat an absent sweep root as an incomplete sweep
2026-08-27 20:30:35 -05:00