3 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
3 people	af0ba19196	Feat/deepx npu detector (#24336) ... * feat(deepx): add DEEPX NPU detector and runtime integration. * feat(deepx): enforce model_format requirement when ppu is enabled and add integrity checks for driver installation * Update frigate/detectors/plugins/deepx.py Public method lacks docstring Co-authored-by: greptile-apps[bot] <165735046+greptile-apps[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * Refactor DEEPX detector tests, support SSD and DAMO-YOLO * feat(deepx): add anchor-free output decoding and corresponding tests * Add tests and updates for DEEPX detector and refactor DEEPX accelerator code structure. * fix: enhance model type validation and update documentation for DEEPX detector * fix: add support for customizable score and NMS thresholds * refactor: infer YOLO layout from the model, drop per-detector options and the dxrtd placeholder * fix: keep only the anchor-free PPU verdict, re-read anchor-based each frame * Update latency data for DEEPX NPU * Expanding PPU support for DEEPX and set yolo-generic as default. * enhance scale count resolution logic * Extend PPU layout handling and YOLOX support to DEEPX detector * fix: assume the largest PPU anchor table when the .dxnn has no layout * Improve PPU decoding and introduce strides handling * Improve PPU scope and fix box format mismatch * Fix unnamed node issue that breaks traversal * fix: update object detection model type description to remove outdated architecture --------- Co-authored-by: greptile-apps[bot] <165735046+greptile-apps[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-09-21 07:50:44 -05:00
Nicolas Mowen	b99c87f272	Fix NPU turbo key and priviledges set (#24138)	2026-09-12 07:30:04 -06:00
Josh HawkinsandNicolas Mowen	3be59c9c18	Container security hardening (phase 3, breaking) (#24081) ... * Run the frigate service as the frigate user * Run go2rtc as its own restricted user * Run nginx as the frigate user with writable state in /tmp/nginx * Disable bandwidth stats gracefully when not running as root * Hand TensorRT model cache ownership to the runtime user * Document non-root operation and per-hardware device access * Create /media/frigate after the ownership sweep * Assert non-root services, JWT migration, and escape hatch in CI * only write the sweep sentinel when a media volume is mounted * tolerate homekit config chown failures in the go2rtc run script * chown the s6 log pipe so non-root nginx can reopen /dev/stdout * set HOME to /config for non-root services * run smoke nginx -t and the write probe as the runtime user * re-own the nginx shm cache on service restart * discard stdout for the unprivileged smoke nginx -t * unwrap hard-wrapped prose in the installation docs * report progress during the ownership sweep * document EXTRA_GROUPS as the only device access path for dropped services * expand the non-root device access docs with diagnosis steps and udev rules * document network storage ownership and the remaining detector hardware * skip lost+found during the ownership sweep * hand /tmp/cache to the runtime user before services start * make bundled models readable by the runtime user * reload nginx by signaling the master instead of parsing its config as root * harden root writes into unprivileged-owned paths Restrict the sweep sentinel to a mount at or below /media/frigate so a parent /media mount cannot bless a later-shadowed volume. Rebuild /tmp/nginx root-owned each start so root's cp and tempio writes cannot follow a symlink an unprivileged nginx planted in the previous run. * collapse the duplicated sentinel comment * add a service-runs-as-root helper for granular root services * validate FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES and fail fast on unknown names * let services listed in FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES skip the privilege drop * record the root-services mode in the sentinel and sweep small trees each boot * cache the runtime ids in the ownership helper * chown recordings, previews, and exports to the runtime user at create * chown the database files after init * recommend FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES in the bandwidth stats warning * assert granular root services in CI * document FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES * own every directory level created for a recording segment * clear the cached runtime ids when ownership tests finish * skip missing media paths in the per-boot ownership sweep * clarify granular root services docs * clean up * install acl for device access grants * grant runtime users access to mapped device nodes at boot * assert device access grants in CI * document automatic device access grants * stop telling users device access needs host side setup * clarify the non-root docs * link the migration script to the repo * group the manual device setup under one section * harden against symlink attacks /config is owned by the unprivileged runtime user after the ownership sweep, so root operations on files there could be redirected by a planted symlink. - go2rtc HomeKit setup: replace the root yq/jq normalization and chown with an O_NOFOLLOW helper (prepare_homekit.py), so a symlink at go2rtc_homekit.yml can't redirect a root write or chown onto another file - go2rtc binary override: ignore /config/go2rtc whenever the service runs as root, so a planted binary can't exec as root under FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES - sweep sentinel: read and write it through safe-sentinel, which trusts only a root-owned regular file and never follows a symlink, so it can't be forged to skip the migration or symlinked to clobber a root file - ownership sweep: chown with -execdir so a parent directory swapped for a symlink mid-walk can't redirect the chown out of the volume - validate inputs: restrict DEVICE_ACL_PATHS to /dev, require nonzero numeric EXTRA_GROUPS, and reject PUID/PGID that collide with the go2rtc ids - docs: correct the TLS key ownership note to match what actually happens * tweak docs * stop the ownership sweep chasing entries other mechanisms own * keep custom binaries out of root services only under granular root	2026-09-12 07:30:04 -06:00