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https://github.com/blakeblackshear/frigate.git
synced 2026-11-16 18:43:02 +03:00
harden against symlink attacks
/config is owned by the unprivileged runtime user after the ownership sweep, so root operations on files there could be redirected by a planted symlink. - go2rtc HomeKit setup: replace the root yq/jq normalization and chown with an O_NOFOLLOW helper (prepare_homekit.py), so a symlink at go2rtc_homekit.yml can't redirect a root write or chown onto another file - go2rtc binary override: ignore /config/go2rtc whenever the service runs as root, so a planted binary can't exec as root under FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES - sweep sentinel: read and write it through safe-sentinel, which trusts only a root-owned regular file and never follows a symlink, so it can't be forged to skip the migration or symlinked to clobber a root file - ownership sweep: chown with -execdir so a parent directory swapped for a symlink mid-walk can't redirect the chown out of the volume - validate inputs: restrict DEVICE_ACL_PATHS to /dev, require nonzero numeric EXTRA_GROUPS, and reject PUID/PGID that collide with the go2rtc ids - docs: correct the TLS key ownership note to match what actually happens
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@@ -70,11 +70,14 @@ if [[ -n "$mode" ]]; then
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sentinel_content="${sentinel_content}:${mode}"
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fi
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# A dry run always inspects: the sentinel records what a past sweep did, not
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# what the volume looks like now, and reporting from it would hide later drift.
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if [[ "$dry_run" -eq 0 && -n "$sentinel" && -f "$sentinel" && "$(cat "$sentinel")" == "$sentinel_content" ]]; then
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echo "[INFO] fix-ownership: ${target_uid}:${target_gid} (schema ${schema}) already applied, skipping"
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exit 0
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# safe-sentinel reports only a root-owned regular file, so a forged or
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# symlinked sentinel in the runtime-user-owned /config can't suppress the sweep
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if [[ "$dry_run" -eq 0 && -n "$sentinel" ]]; then
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if existing=$(/usr/local/bin/safe-sentinel read "$sentinel" 2>/dev/null) && \
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[[ "$existing" == "$sentinel_content" ]]; then
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echo "[INFO] fix-ownership: ${target_uid}:${target_gid} (schema ${schema}) already applied, skipping"
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exit 0
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fi
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fi
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# A sweep that could not chown everything must not be recorded as complete:
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@@ -122,10 +125,11 @@ for path in "$@"; do
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continue
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fi
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# -print feeds the progress counter; -exec {} + keeps the chown batched
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# -execdir chowns from the entry's own directory, so a parent swapped for a
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# symlink mid-walk can't redirect the chown out of the volume
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started=$SECONDS
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if find "$path" -name lost+found -prune -o \( -not -uid "$target_uid" -o -not -gid "$target_gid" \) \
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-print -exec chown -h "${target_uid}:${target_gid}" {} + \
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-print -execdir chown -h "${target_uid}:${target_gid}" {} + \
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| awk -v total="$count" -v path="$path" '
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BEGIN { next_pct = 5 }
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{
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@@ -165,6 +169,6 @@ if [[ "$dry_run" -eq 0 && -d /config ]]; then
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fi
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if [[ "$dry_run" -eq 0 && -n "$sentinel" && "$swept_clean" -eq 1 ]]; then
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echo "$sentinel_content" > "$sentinel" || \
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/usr/local/bin/safe-sentinel write "$sentinel" "$sentinel_content" || \
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echo "[WARN] fix-ownership: could not write ${sentinel}; the sweep will run again on next boot"
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fi
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+74
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
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#!/usr/bin/env python3
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"""Read or write the ownership sweep sentinel without following symlinks.
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The sentinel lives in /config, which the unprivileged runtime user owns, so it
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can be swapped for a symlink. read trusts only a root-owned regular file; write
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never follows a symlink or fifo onto another file.
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Usage:
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safe-sentinel read PATH print content, exit 0 only if root-owned regular file
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safe-sentinel write PATH CONTENT write CONTENT to a regular file at PATH
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"""
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import errno
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import os
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import stat
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import sys
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MODE = 0o644
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def do_read(path: str) -> int:
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try:
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fd = os.open(path, os.O_RDONLY | os.O_NOFOLLOW)
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except OSError:
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return 1
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try:
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st = os.fstat(fd)
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if not stat.S_ISREG(st.st_mode) or st.st_uid != 0:
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return 1
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sys.stdout.buffer.write(os.read(fd, 4096))
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finally:
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os.close(fd)
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return 0
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def do_write(path: str, content: str) -> int:
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# O_NONBLOCK so a fifo fails fast (ENXIO) instead of blocking the open.
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flags = os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_NOFOLLOW | os.O_NONBLOCK
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replace = (errno.ELOOP, errno.ENXIO)
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try:
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fd = os.open(path, flags, MODE)
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if not stat.S_ISREG(os.fstat(fd).st_mode):
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os.close(fd)
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raise OSError(errno.ELOOP, "not a regular file")
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except OSError as err:
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if err.errno not in replace:
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raise
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os.unlink(path)
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fd = os.open(path, flags | os.O_EXCL, MODE)
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try:
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os.ftruncate(fd, 0)
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os.write(fd, content.encode())
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# keep it root-owned so a later sweep that chowned the old sentinel to
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# the runtime user can't make the next read reject and re-sweep
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os.fchown(fd, 0, 0)
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finally:
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os.close(fd)
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return 0
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def main(argv: list[str]) -> int:
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if len(argv) == 3 and argv[1] == "read":
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return do_read(argv[2])
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if len(argv) == 4 and argv[1] == "write":
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try:
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return do_write(argv[2], argv[3])
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except OSError:
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return 1
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print("usage: safe-sentinel read PATH | write PATH CONTENT", file=sys.stderr)
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return 2
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if __name__ == "__main__":
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sys.exit(main(sys.argv))
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