harden against symlink attacks

/config is owned by the unprivileged runtime user after the ownership sweep, so root operations on files there could be redirected by a planted symlink.

- go2rtc HomeKit setup: replace the root yq/jq normalization and chown with an O_NOFOLLOW helper (prepare_homekit.py), so a symlink at go2rtc_homekit.yml can't redirect a root write or chown onto another file
- go2rtc binary override: ignore /config/go2rtc whenever the service runs as root, so a planted binary can't exec as root under FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES
- sweep sentinel: read and write it through safe-sentinel, which trusts only a root-owned regular file and never follows a symlink, so it can't be forged to skip the migration or symlinked to clobber a root file
- ownership sweep: chown with -execdir so a parent directory swapped for a symlink mid-walk can't redirect the chown out of the volume
- validate inputs: restrict DEVICE_ACL_PATHS to /dev, require nonzero numeric EXTRA_GROUPS, and reject PUID/PGID that collide with the go2rtc ids
- docs: correct the TLS key ownership note to match what actually happens
This commit is contained in:
Josh Hawkins
2026-08-29 17:26:17 -05:00
parent baa00147b4
commit 46c189fced
7 changed files with 214 additions and 55 deletions
@@ -57,42 +57,6 @@ function set_libva_version() {
export LIBAVFORMAT_VERSION_MAJOR
}
function setup_homekit_config() {
local config_path="$1"
if [[ ! -f "${config_path}" ]]; then
echo "[INFO] Creating empty config file for HomeKit..."
: > "${config_path}"
fi
# Convert YAML to JSON for jq processing
local temp_json="/tmp/cache/homekit_config.json"
yq eval -o=json "${config_path}" > "${temp_json}" 2>/dev/null || {
echo "[WARNING] Failed to convert HomeKit config to JSON, skipping cleanup"
return 0
}
# Use jq to extract the homekit section, if it exists
local homekit_json
homekit_json=$(jq '
if has("homekit") then {homekit: .homekit} else null end
' "${temp_json}" 2>/dev/null) || homekit_json="null"
# If no homekit section, write an empty config file
if [[ "${homekit_json}" == "null" ]]; then
: > "${config_path}"
else
# Convert homekit JSON back to YAML and write to the config file
echo "${homekit_json}" | yq eval -P - > "${config_path}" 2>/dev/null || {
echo "[WARNING] Failed to convert cleaned config to YAML, creating minimal config"
: > "${config_path}"
}
fi
# Clean up temp files
rm -f "${temp_json}"
}
set_libva_version
if [[ -f "/dev/shm/go2rtc.yaml" ]]; then
@@ -113,21 +77,23 @@ else
echo "[WARNING] Unable to remove existing go2rtc config. Changes made to your frigate config file may not be recognized. Please remove the /dev/shm/go2rtc.yaml from your docker host manually."
fi
# HomeKit configuration persistence setup
# HomeKit persistence. The helper is symlink-safe; hand off to go2rtc only when dropping.
readonly homekit_config_path="/config/go2rtc_homekit.yml"
setup_homekit_config "${homekit_config_path}"
if [[ "$(id -u)" -eq 0 && "$runs_as_root" -eq 0 ]]; then
python3 /usr/local/go2rtc/prepare_homekit.py "${homekit_config_path}" --chown
chown go2rtc:go2rtc /dev/shm/go2rtc.yaml 2>/dev/null || true
# go2rtc rewrites this in place, so owning the file is enough. Tolerated so
# a chown-refusing mount (NFS root_squash) degrades pairing, not the service
chown go2rtc:frigate-data "${homekit_config_path}" 2>/dev/null && chmod 664 "${homekit_config_path}" 2>/dev/null || \
echo "[WARN] Could not hand ${homekit_config_path} to the go2rtc user; HomeKit pairing changes may not persist"
else
python3 /usr/local/go2rtc/prepare_homekit.py "${homekit_config_path}"
fi
readonly config_path="/config"
if [[ -x "${config_path}/go2rtc" ]]; then
# frigate owns /config after the sweep, so a /config/go2rtc override must not
# be honored while this service runs as root
if [[ "$runs_as_root" -eq 1 && -x "${config_path}/go2rtc" ]]; then
echo "[WARN] Ignoring '${config_path}/go2rtc' because this service is running as root; using the embedded binary"
readonly binary_path="/usr/local/go2rtc/bin/go2rtc"
elif [[ -x "${config_path}/go2rtc" ]]; then
readonly binary_path="${config_path}/go2rtc"
echo "[WARN] Using go2rtc binary from '${binary_path}' instead of the embedded one"
else
@@ -41,9 +41,14 @@ device_globs=(
IFS=',' read -ra extra_globs <<< "${DEVICE_ACL_PATHS:-}"
for extra in "${extra_globs[@]}"; do
extra="${extra//[[:space:]]/}"
if [[ -n "$extra" ]]; then
device_globs+=("$extra")
if [[ -z "$extra" ]]; then
continue
fi
if [[ "$extra" != /dev/* || "$extra" == *..* ]]; then
echo "[ERROR] DEVICE_ACL_PATHS entries must be under /dev, got '${extra}'" >&2
exit 1
fi
device_globs+=("$extra")
done
granted=0
@@ -53,6 +53,15 @@ if [[ "$puid" -eq 0 || "$pgid" -eq 0 ]]; then
exit 1
fi
# Colliding with the go2rtc ids would merge the two users and collapse the
# separation between the main process and the network-facing restreamer.
go2rtc_uid="$(id -u go2rtc)"
go2rtc_gid="$(id -g go2rtc)"
if [[ "$puid" -eq "$go2rtc_uid" || "$pgid" -eq "$go2rtc_gid" ]]; then
echo "[ERROR] PUID/PGID must not equal the go2rtc service ids (${go2rtc_uid}:${go2rtc_gid})." >&2
exit 1
fi
current_uid="$(id -u frigate)"
current_gid="$(id -g frigate)"
@@ -71,6 +80,10 @@ fi
# EXTRA_GROUPS: numeric host GIDs granting device access (e.g. host render/video)
if [[ -n "${EXTRA_GROUPS:-}" ]]; then
for gid in ${EXTRA_GROUPS//,/ }; do
if ! [[ "$gid" =~ ^[0-9]+$ ]] || [[ "$gid" -eq 0 ]]; then
echo "[ERROR] EXTRA_GROUPS must be nonzero numeric GIDs, got '${gid}'" >&2
exit 1
fi
if ! getent group "$gid" >/dev/null; then
groupadd -o -g "$gid" "frigate-extra-${gid}"
fi