Container security hardening (phase 4) (#24140)

* Support read-only rootfs with self-signed certs in /config/tls

* Support read-only rootfs in s6 and pre-compile bytecode

* Assert read-only rootfs support in CI

* Document hardened read-only deployment

* keep certsync's cert selection identical to nginx's

* note the uid trade-off in user: mode

* fail fast when EXTRA_GROUPS or a missing media volume meets read_only

* keep nosuid and nodev on the /run tmpfs

* support read_only in the default mode

* don't take go2rtc down when the homekit file isn't writable

* lead with the hardware consequence of switching to user:

* refuse to write TLS material through a symlink as root

* note that memryx writes models to the root filesystem

* certsync watches whichever cert path nginx loaded
This commit is contained in:
Josh Hawkins
2026-09-12 07:30:04 -06:00
committed by Nicolas Mowen
parent b99c87f272
commit 41bc1a5844
11 changed files with 287 additions and 30 deletions
+124 -1
View File
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ jobs:
# directive user; stdout discarded because -t reopens the config's
# /dev/stdout logs and the docker exec pipe is root-owned
docker exec frigate /command/s6-setuidgid frigate bash -c '/usr/local/nginx/sbin/nginx -e stderr -t -c /tmp/nginx/conf/nginx.conf >/dev/null'
docker exec frigate stat -c %a /etc/letsencrypt/live/frigate/privkey.pem | grep -qx 600
docker exec frigate stat -c %a /config/tls/privkey.pem | grep -qx 600
docker exec frigate stat -c %a /dev/shm/go2rtc.yaml | grep -qx 640
- name: Assert services run as non-root
run: |
@@ -293,6 +293,129 @@ jobs:
done
if [ "$ok" -ne 1 ]; then echo "sentinel skip never logged"; docker logs frigate-puid; exit 1; fi
docker rm -f frigate-puid
- name: Assert read-only rootfs with --user works
run: |
mkdir -p /tmp/frigate-config-ro /tmp/frigate-media-ro
printf 'mqtt:\n enabled: false\ncameras: {}\n' > /tmp/frigate-config-ro/config.yml
sudo chown -R 1000:1000 /tmp/frigate-config-ro /tmp/frigate-media-ro
# /run must allow exec: S6_READ_ONLY_ROOT has s6 copy its service
# scripts there and run them, and --tmpfs defaults to noexec
docker run -d --name frigate-ro --shm-size 256m \
--read-only --tmpfs /tmp:rw,size=1g --tmpfs /run:exec,nosuid,nodev,mode=0755 \
--user 1000:1000 \
--security-opt no-new-privileges:true \
-v /tmp/frigate-config-ro:/config \
-v /tmp/frigate-media-ro:/media/frigate \
${{ steps.setup.outputs.image-name }}-amd64
up=0
for i in $(seq 1 60); do
docker exec frigate-ro curl -fs http://127.0.0.1:5000/api/version && up=1 && break
sleep 5
done
if [ "$up" -ne 1 ]; then echo "read-only container never healthy"; docker logs frigate-ro; exit 1; fi
# an if, not "! grep": bash exempts a negated command from set -e and
# the assertion would never fail
if docker logs frigate-ro 2>&1 | grep -i "read-only file system"; then
echo "a service tried to write to the read-only rootfs"; exit 1
fi
# the self-signed cert has to land in /config, the only writable path
docker exec frigate-ro test -f /config/tls/privkey.pem
# and nginx must serve it, which is what proves the templated cert path
docker exec frigate-ro curl -ksSI https://127.0.0.1:8971/ >/dev/null
# logging must work via the s6-log fallback (no logutil-service as non-root)
docker exec frigate-ro test -s /dev/shm/logs/frigate/current
# runtime user can write recordings storage
docker exec frigate-ro touch /media/frigate/.write-probe
docker exec frigate-ro rm /media/frigate/.write-probe
docker rm -f frigate-ro
- name: Assert PUID with read-only fails fast with clear error
run: |
docker run -d --name frigate-ro-puid --shm-size 256m \
--read-only --tmpfs /tmp:rw,size=1g --tmpfs /run:exec,nosuid,nodev,mode=0755 \
-e PUID=1500 -e PGID=1500 \
-v /tmp/frigate-config-ro:/config \
${{ steps.setup.outputs.image-name }}-amd64
found=0
for i in $(seq 1 12); do
if docker logs frigate-ro-puid 2>&1 | grep -q "not compatible with read_only"; then found=1; break; fi
sleep 5
done
if [ "$found" -ne 1 ]; then
echo "no fail-fast error for PUID with a read-only rootfs"; docker logs frigate-ro-puid; exit 1
fi
docker rm -f frigate-ro-puid
- name: Assert EXTRA_GROUPS with read-only fails fast with clear error
run: |
docker run -d --name frigate-ro-groups --shm-size 256m \
--read-only --tmpfs /tmp:rw,size=1g --tmpfs /run:exec,nosuid,nodev,mode=0755 \
-e EXTRA_GROUPS=44 \
-v /tmp/frigate-config-ro:/config \
-v /tmp/frigate-media-ro:/media/frigate \
${{ steps.setup.outputs.image-name }}-amd64
found=0
for i in $(seq 1 12); do
if docker logs frigate-ro-groups 2>&1 | grep -q "EXTRA_GROUPS needs a writable /etc"; then found=1; break; fi
sleep 5
done
if [ "$found" -ne 1 ]; then
echo "no fail-fast error for EXTRA_GROUPS with a read-only rootfs"; docker logs frigate-ro-groups; exit 1
fi
docker rm -f frigate-ro-groups
- name: Assert read-only rootfs in the default mode works
run: |
mkdir -p /tmp/frigate-config-rod /tmp/frigate-media-rod
printf 'mqtt:\n enabled: false\ncameras: {}\n' > /tmp/frigate-config-rod/config.yml
docker run -d --name frigate-rod --shm-size 256m \
--read-only --tmpfs /tmp:rw,size=1g --tmpfs /run:exec,nosuid,nodev,mode=0755 \
--security-opt no-new-privileges:true \
-v /tmp/frigate-config-rod:/config \
-v /tmp/frigate-media-rod:/media/frigate \
${{ steps.setup.outputs.image-name }}-amd64
up=0
for i in $(seq 1 60); do
docker exec frigate-rod curl -fs http://127.0.0.1:5000/api/version && up=1 && break
sleep 5
done
if [ "$up" -ne 1 ]; then echo "read-only default-mode container never healthy"; docker logs frigate-rod; exit 1; fi
if docker logs frigate-rod 2>&1 | grep -i "read-only file system"; then
echo "a service tried to write to the read-only rootfs"; exit 1
fi
# the point of this mode over docker's user:: the drop still happens
# and go2rtc still gets its own separate user
ps_out=$(docker exec frigate-rod ps -eo user=,comm=)
echo "$ps_out"
for svc in python3 nginx; do
if echo "$ps_out" | grep -w "$svc" | grep -q '^root'; then
echo "$svc is running as root"; exit 1
fi
done
echo "$ps_out" | grep -w go2rtc | grep -q '^go2rtc'
# the ownership sweep still ran and recorded itself in /config
docker exec frigate-rod cat /config/.permissions_version | grep -qx "2:1000:1000"
# setfacl under a read-only rootfs, which nothing else covers:
# init-devices exits early under --user, so that path is never reached
docker exec frigate-rod mknod /dev/apex_9 c 120 99
docker exec frigate-rod /etc/s6-overlay/s6-rc.d/init-devices/run
docker exec frigate-rod getfacl -p /dev/apex_9 | grep -q "user:frigate:rw-"
docker rm -f frigate-rod
- name: "Assert switching that install to user: still starts"
run: |
# the config dir above now holds a go2rtc-owned go2rtc_homekit.yml,
# which user: keeps readable but not writable (no supplementary groups)
docker run -d --name frigate-rod-user --shm-size 256m \
--read-only --tmpfs /tmp:rw,size=1g --tmpfs /run:exec,nosuid,nodev,mode=0755 \
--user 1000:1000 \
-v /tmp/frigate-config-rod:/config \
-v /tmp/frigate-media-rod:/media/frigate \
${{ steps.setup.outputs.image-name }}-amd64
up=0
for i in $(seq 1 60); do
docker exec frigate-rod-user curl -fs http://127.0.0.1:5000/api/version && up=1 && break
sleep 5
done
if [ "$up" -ne 1 ]; then echo "container did not survive the switch to user:"; docker logs frigate-rod-user; exit 1; fi
docker logs frigate-rod-user 2>&1 | grep -q "HomeKit pairing changes will not persist"
docker rm -f frigate-rod-user
- name: Teardown
if: always()
run: docker rm -f frigate || true