Container security hardening (phase 3, breaking) (#24081)

* Run the frigate service as the frigate user * Run go2rtc as its own restricted user * Run nginx as the frigate user with writable state in /tmp/nginx * Disable bandwidth stats gracefully when not running as root * Hand TensorRT model cache ownership to the runtime user * Document non-root operation and per-hardware device access * Create /media/frigate after the ownership sweep * Assert non-root services, JWT migration, and escape hatch in CI * only write the sweep sentinel when a media volume is mounted * tolerate homekit config chown failures in the go2rtc run script * chown the s6 log pipe so non-root nginx can reopen /dev/stdout * set HOME to /config for non-root services * run smoke nginx -t and the write probe as the runtime user * re-own the nginx shm cache on service restart * discard stdout for the unprivileged smoke nginx -t * unwrap hard-wrapped prose in the installation docs * report progress during the ownership sweep * document EXTRA_GROUPS as the only device access path for dropped services * expand the non-root device access docs with diagnosis steps and udev rules * document network storage ownership and the remaining detector hardware * skip lost+found during the ownership sweep * hand /tmp/cache to the runtime user before services start * make bundled models readable by the runtime user * reload nginx by signaling the master instead of parsing its config as root * harden root writes into unprivileged-owned paths Restrict the sweep sentinel to a mount at or below /media/frigate so a parent /media mount cannot bless a later-shadowed volume. Rebuild /tmp/nginx root-owned each start so root's cp and tempio writes cannot follow a symlink an unprivileged nginx planted in the previous run. * collapse the duplicated sentinel comment * add a service-runs-as-root helper for granular root services * validate FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES and fail fast on unknown names * let services listed in FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES skip the privilege drop * record the root-services mode in the sentinel and sweep small trees each boot * cache the runtime ids in the ownership helper * chown recordings, previews, and exports to the runtime user at create * chown the database files after init * recommend FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES in the bandwidth stats warning * assert granular root services in CI * document FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES * own every directory level created for a recording segment * clear the cached runtime ids when ownership tests finish * skip missing media paths in the per-boot ownership sweep * clarify granular root services docs * clean up * install acl for device access grants * grant runtime users access to mapped device nodes at boot * assert device access grants in CI * document automatic device access grants * stop telling users device access needs host side setup * clarify the non-root docs * link the migration script to the repo * group the manual device setup under one section * harden against symlink attacks /config is owned by the unprivileged runtime user after the ownership sweep, so root operations on files there could be redirected by a planted symlink. - go2rtc HomeKit setup: replace the root yq/jq normalization and chown with an O_NOFOLLOW helper (prepare_homekit.py), so a symlink at go2rtc_homekit.yml can't redirect a root write or chown onto another file - go2rtc binary override: ignore /config/go2rtc whenever the service runs as root, so a planted binary can't exec as root under FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES - sweep sentinel: read and write it through safe-sentinel, which trusts only a root-owned regular file and never follows a symlink, so it can't be forged to skip the migration or symlinked to clobber a root file - ownership sweep: chown with -execdir so a parent directory swapped for a symlink mid-walk can't redirect the chown out of the volume - validate inputs: restrict DEVICE_ACL_PATHS to /dev, require nonzero numeric EXTRA_GROUPS, and reject PUID/PGID that collide with the go2rtc ids - docs: correct the TLS key ownership note to match what actually happens * tweak docs * stop the ownership sweep chasing entries other mechanisms own * keep custom binaries out of root services only under granular root
2026-09-28 07:08:59 +03:00 · 2026-09-12 07:30:04 -06:00
parent 1693415375
commit 3be59c9c18
38 changed files with 1427 additions and 83 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+"""Normalize the go2rtc HomeKit file and hand it to go2rtc, as root.
+
+Runs before the drop. The file is in the runtime-user-owned /config, so a
+planted symlink could redirect the root write or chown onto another file;
+every operation goes through an O_NOFOLLOW fd to prevent that.
+
+Usage: prepare_homekit.py PATH [--chown]
+"""
+
+import errno
+import grp
+import io
+import os
+import pwd
+import stat
+import sys
+
+from ruamel.yaml import YAML
+
+RUNTIME_OWNER = "go2rtc"
+SHARED_GROUP = "frigate-data"
+MODE = 0o664
+MAX_BYTES = 10 * 1024 * 1024
+
+
+def open_nofollow(path: str) -> int:
+    """Return an fd to a regular file at path, never following a symlink."""
+    flags = os.O_RDWR | os.O_CREAT | os.O_NOFOLLOW
+    try:
+        fd = os.open(path, flags, MODE)
+    except OSError as err:
+        if err.errno != errno.ELOOP:
+            raise
+        os.unlink(path)
+        return os.open(path, flags | os.O_EXCL, MODE)
+
+    # A fifo or other non-regular file would hang or misbehave on read; replace it.
+    if not stat.S_ISREG(os.fstat(fd).st_mode):
+        os.close(fd)
+        os.unlink(path)
+        return os.open(path, flags | os.O_EXCL, MODE)
+    return fd
+
+
+def normalize(content: str) -> str:
+    """Keep only the homekit section, matching the previous yq/jq behavior."""
+    yaml = YAML(typ="safe")
+    try:
+        data = yaml.load(content)
+    except Exception:
+        return ""
+
+    if not isinstance(data, dict) or "homekit" not in data:
+        return ""
+
+    buf = io.StringIO()
+    yaml.dump({"homekit": data["homekit"]}, buf)
+    return buf.getvalue()
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    if len(sys.argv) < 2:
+        print("[ERROR] prepare_homekit: PATH is required", file=sys.stderr)
+        return 2
+
+    path = sys.argv[1]
+    do_chown = "--chown" in sys.argv[2:]
+
+    fd = open_nofollow(path)
+    try:
+        content = os.read(fd, MAX_BYTES).decode("utf-8", "replace")
+        normalized = normalize(content)
+        os.ftruncate(fd, 0)
+        os.lseek(fd, 0, os.SEEK_SET)
+        os.write(fd, normalized.encode("utf-8"))
+
+        if do_chown:
+            # tolerate a chown-refusing mount (NFS root_squash): pairing
+            # persistence degrades, the service does not
+            try:
+                uid = pwd.getpwnam(RUNTIME_OWNER).pw_uid
+                gid = grp.getgrnam(SHARED_GROUP).gr_gid
+                os.fchown(fd, uid, gid)
+                os.fchmod(fd, MODE)
+            except (KeyError, OSError):
+                print(
+                    f"[WARN] Could not hand {path} to the go2rtc user; "
+                    "HomeKit pairing changes may not persist"
+                )
+    finally:
+        os.close(fd)
+
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    sys.exit(main())